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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

Tax increment financing (TIF) policy is the most popular economic development
policy in the United States. Despite the popularity of research on TIF, only a few
comprehensive reviews of previous studies on TIF policy tool have been conducted. In
light of this, the purpose of this paper is to review previous TIF studies relating to the
controversy surrounding TIF programs. Specifically, previous studies do not provide clear
answers about the efficacy of TIF and, indeed, raise more questions than answers. At the
same time, this situation begs the question: why do local governments frequently use
economic development policies? This is the most urgent task in the economic development
academic area because previous studies have not answered that question in detail. To
analyze the effects of competition and the forms of government on the utilization of
business incentives at the local government level, this study focuses on two major
incentives: tax credit and tax increment financing. The statistical results show that the
competition mechanisms operate differently for each of the incentives. More specifically,
the council-manager system considerably constrains the overall adoption and extent of use
of business incentives. These results could indicate the prevalence of a particular form of
government for economic development policies. To determine why local governments
often use tax-based incentives, this study focuses on five major tax-based incentives: job
creation tax credits, investment tax credits, R&D credits, property tax abatements, and
customized job training subsidies. The statistical results indicate that a state government’s
prevailing political ideology influences the choice of economic development activities.
Accordingly, a more liberal state may be more likely to discourage property tax abatements
and customized job-training subsidies and encourage job creation tax credits. Additionally,
the competition mechanism does not operate as a trigger for tax-based incentives. This
study also finds that state economic conditions are inversely related to the use of incentives.
This result could imply the prevalence of political factors in the use of incentives. Clear
evidence about the effectiveness of economic development incentives is limited. To bridge
this research gap, this study uses the Upjohn Institute Panel Database on Incentives and
Taxes (PDIT). Unemployment and employment rates are used to analyze the effectiveness
of tax-based incentives. Statistical results indicate that tax incentives have a marginal
impact on employment status and limited benefits to states. Only the R&D tax credit
statistically significantly increases employment rates. This result supports the
interpretation of economic development policies as a zero-sum game
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game, Diffusion mechanism
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CHAPTER 1. AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY: TAX INCREMENTAL
FINANCING.
1.1

Introduction

Confronted with a high unemployment rate, state and local governments have
experienced double torture (Wu, 2012), with the resulting crisis locking local
governments in a vicious cycle. Specifically, high unemployment leads to significant
reductions in local government revenues and requires government to spend more
resources and operate more programs. Statistical indicators support this serious situation.
Not only have 27 metropolitan areas among 45 in the Northeast already faced “chronic
distress,” `but also 33 Midwest metropolitan areas have experienced a similar fate since
the 1970s (Porter, 2018). Thus, state governments are actively operating local
development policies that are aimed at increasing local tax bases and jobs. The extent and
type of economic development policies varies depending on each state (Wang, 2018).
Substantial attention and interest have existed in the academic field due to the
dramatic spread of economic development policies, with the majority of studies analyzing
the effect of such policies at the local level (Betz, Partridge, Kraybill, & Lobao, 2012).
As more studies are conducted, academic disputes continue about the effect of economic
development policies. A few studies suggest that there is a positive relationship between
economic outcomes and economic development policies (Peters & Fisher, 2002;
Rodriguez-Poase & Arbix, 2001). Many previous studies have made counterarguments
concerning the positive effects of economic development policies. Some argue that a
possibility exists that incentive policies could have a negative impact on local areas
because of the evils of competition (Ellis & Rogers, 2000; Patrick, 2014). Others argue
that this severe competition could lead to the under-provision of public goods because
1

economic development policies simply relocate businesses (Bartik, 1991; Fisher &
Peters, 1997; Gorin, 2008; Wang, 2016). Furthermore, Burstein and Rolnick (1995)
suggest that targeting incentives for a specific industry could cause losses in the national
economy. We can confirm that the results of economic development policies are mixed.
Surprisingly, few studies analyze why local governments continue to engage in economic
development policies even though supporting evidence is lacking.
The most widely used policies are diverse subsidies and incentives including
industrial parks and tax abatement (Betz et al., 2012). One of the most popular of many
economic development policies that local governments offer is tax increment financing
(Hall & Bartels, 2014; Nguyen-Hoang, 2018). As discussed, promoting economic
development is an essential function of local governments and requires cooperation
between municipalities and private investors. Tax increment financing (TIF) is one of the
options that local governments can use to encourage economic development in a specific
area. It allows local governments to increase property tax revenue based on expected
higher property values following investment in a TIF district. TIF is also an incentive tool
that can boost local economies (Yadavalli & Landers, 2017). Local governments often
issue bonds to finance TIF projects because municipalities expect increased tax revenues
to be generated as a result of the projects. If all goes as planned, TIFs can fund
redevelopment programs and the construction of infrastructure. However, the evaluation
of the previous studies about TIFs is also controversial, like other economic development
policies.
Despite the popularity of research on TIF, not much attention has been devoted to
a comprehensive review of past literature on this popular fiscal tool (Brueckner, 2001).

2

The main focus of the previous studies is whether TIF programs can produce planned
desirable output in a relevant area. Although there are many studies, it is difficult to
recognize the relevant economic development and TIF overall issues because each study
usually focuses on a specific program and area. In this regard, it is necessary to find
unsatisfactory and undeveloped research topics and issues about economic development
policies by reviewing previous TIF studies. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is to
review previous TIF studies relating to the controversy surrounding the program. One of
the contributions of this study is summarizing the relevant economic development issues
and finding weak spots in current studies to suggest further studies. This study bridges
this gap by the following methods. First, this paper will provide a brief background on
economic development such as tax-based incentives. Then, it will review TIF studies,
including discussions of the definition of TIF, its rationale, process, and present status.
Finally, this study will summarize the issues and suggest further studies.

1.2

Economic Development

Many countries have used economic development policies to address population
growth, competition among municipalities, and war. Limited resources tend to make it
difficult at the national level. State and local governments usually experience more
difficulty than federal governments during an economic crisis because they lack financial
resources and professional manpower. This concern is becoming a reality. State and local
governments face a particular challenge: the high rate of unemployment after a recent
economic crisis (Wu, 2012). This means that the local government must devote more
money to the unemployed and face a decline in revenue because of economic downturn.
In this situation, if the state and local governments use inappropriate policy tools, there
3

may be a negative impact on the local government and a delay in the pace of economic
recovery (Wu, 2012).
To overcome this situation, state and local governments need to be aware of how
a change in economic development policies can influence the economic situation. This is
because economic development policies that usually benefit a specific type of
government are not designed to benefit other municipalities In addition, there is
increasing demand for state and local governments “to do something about jobs” (Bartik,
2012, p.545). As municipalities take action on economic development, tax increment
financing (TIF) has been regarded as the most compelling alternative public financing
tool (Briffaulff, 2010).
Although there is always significant doubt about the effectiveness of an economic
development policy such as business incentives (Warner & Zheng, 2013), these policies
have been used for long periods and adapted with the times. The use and adoption of
economic development policies became a common tool between the 1970s and the 1990s.
This trend naturally led to intense competition among the municipalities (Buss, 2001;
Watson, 1995). In general, three waves or types of economic development policies are
acknowledged in the previous studies (Zheng & Warner, 2010). A business attraction
strategy is the first wave. The characteristics of this tool are defined by programs that
pursue or target a specific business to expand or relocate to local governments (Zheng &
Warner, 2010). The classic examples of business attraction among economy development
policies are tax exemptions, direct payments, and subsidized loans (Koven & Lyons,
2006; Olberding, 2002). The second wave of economic development strategy, business
retention, differs slightly from the previous wave. Specifically, this strategy focuses
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mainly on existing businesses and firms that cluster locally through the provision of
marketing support and improvement of local infrastructure (Christopherson & Clark,
2007; Porter, 2000). In other words, this strategy is aimed at maintaining the competitive
edge of local government (Fosler, 1992). The typical example of the second wave
economic development policy is technical support, marketing, and revolving loans funds
that promote the remaining businesses in the community (Olberding, 2002). While these
first and second wave policies have received considerable attention, they have drawn
sharp criticism from previous studies. The greatest criticism of these two waves of
policies is that the benefits of these policies are concentrated on a specific group, such as
highly skilled workers and businesses requiring high skills (Koven & Lyons, 2006).
Lastly, the third wave of economic development policy extended the scope of
policy targets. This type of policy has more diverse objectives than the previous waves:
(1) promoting public investment for improving quality of life and (2) correcting social
justice for the local community (Warner, 2001). Compared to the previous policy waves,
this one tends to consider the overall community level. For example, microenterprises for
small business owners and development policies for low-density areas are typical
examples of third wave policies (Bennett & Giloth, 2008; Gunn & Gunn, 1991). This
type of strategy has become common among local governments since 2000 (Bennett &
Giloth, 2008). Because the purpose of a TIF program is to revive deteriorating or blighted
areas to achieve overall community development, it is classified as a third-wave policy
type. However, tax credit, the other research subject, is included in the first wave of
policy strategy because tax credit policy is generally granted to specific firms and groups.
In this sense, it would be meaningful to analyze the extent to which competition has an

5

effect on municipalities’ decision-making regarding economic development priorities, as
well as how it differently affects the extensive use of each business incentive as an
economic development policy.

1.2.1

Definition of Economic Development

Local governments in the U.S. have continuously made efforts to retain business
or to attract investment. This is because intense competition among municipalities could
easily cause a local government to backslide from the current economic status if
municipalities shirk their responsibility and fail to correctly diagnose their circumstances.
To maintain their current position, the adoption of economic development policies and
incentives to attract business is the main and easiest method that has been widely
accepted among the municipalities. Economic development policy is a generic term to
describe the process that is aimed at increasing or improving communities’ social wellbeing and material status (Bowman, 1988). Each government has different goals when
adopting economic development policies. Specifically, the primary purposes of an
economic development policy consist of providing job opportunities, increasing capital
investment, and promoting community development (Bowman, 1988).
First, we will discuss how economic development has been defined. The broad
consensus is that it refers to “Changes that affect a local economy’s capacity to create
wealth for local residents” (Bartik, 2012, p.545). More specifically, it refers to:
State and local governments making an effort to boost or secure employment
opportunities or business activity in an area. The way of improving the relevant area is
based on existing natural, human, and institutional resources (Leigh & Blakely, 2013).
6

The main goal of local economic development is to provide more local employment
opportunities for residents (Leigh & Blakely, 2013).
Therefore, various economic indicators could be used as reference points for state
and local economic situations. New plants, population growth, employment growth,
foreign direct investment, and new plant openings are economic indicators (Wu, 2012).
In the literature, there are two types of factors that influence economic development. The
first are nonfiscal factors (Wu, 2012). These include, for example, labor quality, market
demand, energy costs, climate, and natural resources. The second type are fiscal factors
(Wu, 2012). These include state and local government taxes of corporations and firms.
Because TIF is a fiscal factor, this paper will focus on the second type. The difference
between nonfiscal and fiscal factors depends on whether the government has control. The
government can easily control tax policy. However, it is difficult for the government to
control nonfiscal factors.
1.2.2

Evaluation Standard for Economic Development

A value judgement is required to estimate degrees of economic development. This
is because each person has different criteria for assessment. To address this problem,
Courant (1994) proposed some criteria of assessment. According to him, policies should
focus on improving economic welfare (Greenbaum, Russell, & Petras, 2010). However,
the meaning of economic welfare can be vague. As such, it is necessary to define
economic welfare in order to specify the variables. The meaning of economic welfare
relates to how well the policies are structured (Peters & Fisher, 2004).
Studies on economic development are numerous and diverse. However, the results
of these studies have not given us clear guidance in terms of effectiveness (Patrick,
7

2014). Indeed, research into the impacts of TIF have produced mixed results (Greenbaum
& Landers, 2014).
1.2.3

Present Condition of Economic Development

Two types of research are being carried out to obtain more conclusive information
on local economic development. One type of research looks at general tax policies, while
the other type examines incentives in specific business fields. Recently, research flow has
shifted from tax policies to tax incentives (Wu, 2008).
1.2.3.1 General Tax Policies
Many policy makers in the United States have focused substantial attention on the
role of tax policy in economic development. A substantial body of research has examined
the effects of tax policies on local economic development. One of the major questions
about this field is the degree to which higher taxation distorts business activities.
Generally, statistical results have indicated that major local taxes tend to have a negative
effect on business employment (Wu, 2012). Local property tax has been one of the main
subjects discussed in relation to economic development. Specifically, property and
income taxes have had significantly negative effects on job location in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area (Luce, 1994). Furthermore, in the Chicago area, a high property tax
rate has hampered business location decisions (Dye, McGuire, & Merriman, 2001). If
there is a tax cut, it will have a positive impact on employment growth (Zidar, 2019).
However, there are different results concerning the effect of government tax policy on
development. For example, a few studies suggest that there is no statistically significant
effect on economic development (McGuire, 2003; Wasylenko, & McGuire, 1985).
McGuire (2003) argues that just eight estimated tax coefficients are significant, and this
8

is strong evidence for the insignificant effect of taxes. Other previous studies also suggest
that the average tax rate is not statistically related to economic growth, such as GDP
(Agell, Lindh, & Ohlsson, 1997; Koester & Kormendi, 1989).
To date, previous studies have not shown an empirical consensus about general
tax policies (Wu, 2012). It is no wonder that discrepancies exist about the results because
over 50 variables are significantly associated with economic activities (Levine & Renelt,
1992). At the same time, these mixed results induce us to do more comprehensive
empirical research.
1.2.3.2 Tax Incentives
Business or economic-development incentives are “tax breaks, cash, or services
that are at least somewhat customized to the need(s) of an individual business and are
awarded with some discretion” (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014, p. 315). For example, state and
local governments may designate a specific area as an enterprise zone to induce private
investment. If a firm moves to the targeted area, it receives benefits, including tax
abatements. In return, governments expect to boost the local economy by attracting more
investment and increasing employment and consumption. In other words, the purpose of
business incentives is to impact business expansion, openings, and location.
During an economic crisis, state and local governments usually experience more
difficulties than the federal government because they often lack financial resources and
professional staff to weather the storm and have difficulty running budgetary deficits.
Currently, the primary challenge facing state and local governments is the high rate of
unemployment after the recent economic crisis (Wu, 2012). In addition, increasing
demand exists for state and local governments “to do something about jobs” (Bartik,
9

2012, p. 545). Local governments need to devote more money to unemployed people
while facing a decline in revenue brought on by economic downturns. In such situations,
local and state governments try nearly everything to increase private investment and job
creation. Rubin described this effort as “shooting anything that flies and claiming
anything that falls” (Rubin, 1988, p. 236). However, raising taxes may affect the local
government negatively and delay the pace of economic recovery in the current situation
(Wu, 2012). For instance, higher taxes on firms may add to the cost of business.
To overcome this situation, state and local governments actively have engaged in
tax-based incentives, the rationale behind which is that they lead to business investment
and new jobs, stimulating local demand for goods and services, and giving rise to further
rounds of economic growth. However, differences of opinion exist on this point.
Furthermore, policymakers who favor this approach argue that economic growth
increases public revenue, allowing for improved public services or a decrease in tax rates
(Peters & Fisher, 2004). However, certain studies criticize economic-incentive policies
for often being wasteful and having, at best, a minor impact on growth in employment or
investment (Hanson, 2009; Neumark & Kolko, 2010).
Most states have several types of tax-based incentives, such as tax credits, tax
exemptions, and infrastructure investments (Pew Center Report, 2012). Tax-based
incentives substantially have grown over the past 25 years, but they vary from state to
state. Figure 1.1 shows this variation. The darker the color, the more tax-based incentives
offered by the state.
The first map shows the status of tax-based incentives in 1990, when few state
governments used them. Those that made extensive use of them include Nebraska,
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Michigan, and New York. The second map shows the variation in tax-based incentives
from 1990 to 2000. The shade of color used indicates the difference between tax
incentives from 1990 to 2000. State governments actively increased the use of tax-based
incentives during this time. Kentucky is one example. The third map reveals the
differences in tax-based incentives between 2000 and 2007. Although tax-incentive use
continued to increase, the pace slowed down. The last map depicts the variation from
2007 to 2015. Overall, some states cut back on tax-based incentives while others
increased their use. The figures demonstrate that state governments favored tax-based
incentive policies from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Now, it seems that the situation
dictates whether a state will utilize such policies.

Figure 1.1 State variations in tax-based incentives
(Source: Upjohn Institute).
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1.2.3.3 Economic Effects of Tax-based Incentives
Many studies have argued that tax-based incentives fail to achieve their intended
policy outcomes. They have attributed the problem with current policies to the local
decision-making process, as local policymakers often overestimate the benefits of
incentives. Moreover, this debate is dominated by business interests (Bartik, 2005). For
example, state and local governments often provide tax incentives where job creation is
too expensive or is unlikely to improve the employment opportunities of residents
(Bartik, 2005). In addition, many tax incentives target firms or industries rather than
people in need. Peters and Fisher (2004) examined both tax-based incentives—such as
property tax abatements, tax-increment financing, sales tax exemptions, and credits for
investment or jobs—as well as non-tax incentives, such as business grants, loans, and
loan guarantees. They found that, in all cases, the firm was the initial recipient of the
incentive.
Since the 1980s, researchers have conducted studies to determine the factors that
are important for determining a firm’s location. According to the previous literature, state
and local taxes did not significantly affect a firm’s location (Buss, 2001). Some studies
have found that incentives have a negligible impact on a firm’s location and investment
decisions because state and local taxes constitute a small fraction—approximately
1.8%—of an average company’s costs of doing business (Bartik, 2003; Betz et al., 2012;
Davis, 2013; Felix & Hines, 2013). Peters and Fisher (2004) found that, in as many as
nine times out of ten, firms would hire or invest even absent the incentive.
Until the 1990s, few attempts were made to distinguish general tax policy and
public service (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). By the late 2000s, many studies had examined
12

the effects of business incentives. Several have analyzed the overall business or several
incentives (Calcagno & Thompson, 2004; Gabe & Kraybill, 2002; Lee, 2008). A few
studies have focused on specific cases, such as new factories that received business
incentives (Edmiston, 2004; Fox & Murray, 2004). Others have analyzed one type of
business incentive, such as enterprise zones, customized job training, manufacturing
extension services, tax-increment financing districts, or tax credits tied to job creation
(Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). Table 1.1 briefly summarize the key literature on the
economic effects of tax-based incentives (TIFs).
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Table 1.1 Summary of the key literature on the economic effects of tax-based incentives
(TIFs).
Author
(year)

Study subject

Time
period

Unit of
analysis

Analytic
method

Holzer et
al. (1993)

State-financed
training grant
program

1987–
1989

Michigan Difference in
differences

Yes, the grant
program achieved
the goal.

Wassmer
(1994)

TIF projects

1947–
1992

Detroit

Regression
analysis

Yes, they had a
positive impact on
retail employment
and retail sales.

Peters and
Fisher
(2004)

Business
incentives

1961–
2002

Previous
studies

Comprehensive No, it is necessary
reviews
to radically
change incentive
policies

Bartik
(2005)

Economic
development
policies

1986–
2004

Research
literature

Comprehensive No, they are too
reviews
expensive.

Goetz et
al. (2011)

State
economic
performance

2000–
2007

State

Benchmark
regressions

Bartik and
Erickcek
(2014)

MEGA tax
credit program

1996–
2007

Michigan Regional
economic
model

No, there was no
positive effect on
employment
growth.

Lester
(2014)

TIF

1990–
2008

Chicago

No, there was no
evidence of
economic
benefits.

Difference in
differences

Are economic
development
incentives
effective?

No, they are more
likely to harm
growth.

Some studies have revealed that business incentives are not only inefficient: They
also have no positive effect on employment growth (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). Goetz,
Partridge, Rickman, and Majumdar (2011) examined the extent to which economic
development policies promote growth and produce economic gains across the population.
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They found no evidence of the effectiveness of lower taxes on a state’s economic
performance, suggesting that targeted tax incentives and financial assistance are more
likely to harm growth and income inequality. The likely reason is that lower taxes may
reduce government revenue—which could be used to provide services such as education
and infrastructure—without expanding or increasing employment. If this is the case, such
a policy not only fails to bring promised economic benefits to a community but also
wastes money states could otherwise use to build a solid foundation for economic
development (Williams, 2017). On the other hand, several studies have indicated that
customized job training has a positive impact on the local area (Hollenbeck, 2008;
Holzer, Block, Cheatham, & Knott, 1993; Hoyt & Jepsen, 2008). Although recent trends
have shifted toward building a firm’s capacity, developing human capital, and enhancing
quality of life, economic-development policy historically has focused on attracting new
businesses or preventing companies from leaving by offering financial incentives, usually
in the form of tax abatements. As research on business incentives offers mixed results, it
is necessary to analyze why state and local governments still actively use tax-based
incentives with uncertain results.
Generally, there are two justifications for why local governments have adopted
economic incentives. Peter (1988) provided two reasons: (1) Economic incentives are
expected to increase business investment, thereby creating new jobs, which will facilitate
economic growth; (2) This economic growth will increase local government revenue,
which will improve the quality of public services. TIF is also a place-based incentive and
addresses both justifications as a policy tool.
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1.3

Tax Increment Financing
1.3.1

What is TIF?

The National Association of Home Builders’ report evaluated TIF as the most popular
financing tool among state practices (Kane & Weber, 2016; Smith, 2006). In the 1980s,
fiscal responsibility shifted from federal to local government. This trend contributed to
the proliferation of TIF as a policy tool (Huddleston, 1981; Weber & O’Neill-Kohl,
2013). Historically, many people have supported TIF because it is a self-financing
economic development tool that does not lead to reduced government revenue
(Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). This self-financing characteristic distinguishes it from
other economic development programs such as tax credits, tax abatements, enterprise
zones, and other subsidy programs.

Figure 1.2 The mechanism of TIF
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Figure 1.2 explains the process of Tax Increment Financing (TIF). Local governments
must borrow capital when they implement a TIF project, and they usually use bond
issuance to finance its development. Both public and private economic activities have
been increased due to TIF projects. Thus, they have led to a net inflow of economic
activities. Finally, the effects of the activities give rise to higher property tax revenues,
which will be used to repay revenue bonds and interest. This process is the basic concept
of TIF.
When implementing a TIF program, local government officials are typically
deeply involved because they designate TIF program areas, which are expected to finance
certain aspects of economic development. Growth in local tax revenue is expected in the
TIF program area. Specifically, there are two components: base revenues and incremental
revenues. Base revenues refer to a certain amount of total tax revenues before a TIF
program is implemented. Incremental revenues indicate the difference between excess
future revenues and base revenues. TIF projects lead to excess revenues compared to base
revenues. Based on incremental revenues, local governments that implement TIF
programs independently provide residents with economic development subsidies to
promote economic growth and to cover program expenditure. This is the basic logic of
TIF programs.
1.3.2

Local Policy Environment

Discussing the TIF should be preceded by explaining the local policy environment
because this influences the local TIF projects. There are two essential concepts in the
local policy area, “Dillon’s rule” and “Home rule.” Specifically, Dillon’s rule originated
from Clark v. City of Des Moines (1865) (Richardson, 2011). It indicates that local
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government could have power and authority when the state government clearly grants
such authority (Richardson, Gough, & Puentes, 2003). Now, 39 states adopt Dillon’s rule
when they define the authority of local government, and 31 states apply Dillon’s rule to
the entire local area (Richardson, 2011). The majority of U.S. states currently employ
Dillon’s rule.
The adoption of the Home rule began with backlash against the current Dillon’s
rule. Specifically, Dillon’s rule did not efficiently control local governments, and state
legislatures failed to specify the role of local governments (Barron, 2003). The definition
of the Home rule is that local governments could have their power and authority through
the state constitution and legislative action. It means that local governments with the
Home rule tend to have more discretionary authority than local governments with
Dillon’s rule.
If we apply this issue to the TIF project, we realize that TIF projects have
characteristics of both rules. Specifically, most state governments enable local
governments to undertake TIF projects through each state TIF legislation. In other words,
local governments could have discretionary authority by state government grant. At the
same time, local governments usually have enough power to enact policy in the TIF
projects. In this sense, TIF, one of the main economic development policies, is a mixture
of both rules.
1.3.3

The TIF Process and Conditions

State legislation allows municipalities to use TIF. Most state laws specify detailed
checklists and activities for operating and establishing a TIF program. Each state has a
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different implementation scope and process (Kane & Weber, 2016). Nonetheless, there
are generally two common denominators regarding preconditions for TIF. First, many
states require a certain amount of evidence regarding blight (Weber & O’Neill-Kohl,
2013). For example, Illinois requires five types of evidence: blighted area, excessive
vacancy, obsolescence, deleterious land use layout, lack of ventilation, and proof of
below structure minimum code standard (Kane & Weber, 2016). After this first condition
is met, the municipality needs to demonstrate the “but for” condition. This refers to
whether, without the benefit of a TIF program, a designated area will fail to experience
economic growth (Briffaulff, 2010). When these two preconditions are satisfied, local
governments can establish a TIF ordinance and designate a certain area as a TIF district.
To implement TIF, municipalities should carefully select a specific geographic
area for redevelopment in order to increase tax revenue to offset the cost of development.
During this process, local governments generally issue debt, such as revenue bonds, to
cover the costs of developing the designated area (Kane & Weber, 2016). If the TIF
project achieves its goals—namely, inducing private investment and making the district
an attractive place to do business—then property prices will increase. This increment will
cover TIF-related expenses. The creation of such a virtuous circle is the intent behind the
basic TIF process.
1.3.4

The Goal and Rationale of TIF

The fundamental purpose of this policy tool is to promote redevelopment and
economic development. This goal is present in TIF legislation, which is designed to
revive blighted or deteriorating local areas and to create new jobs (Kane & Weber, 2016).
In this sense, TIF is regarded as a catalyst for local development. To achieve this goal,
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public investment in deteriorating areas that are less likely to induce new business or
investment without public intervention should be prioritized. According to Bland and
Overton (2014), public investment is necessary for a partnership’s success. Such a
partnership is based on private investment that will increase local property values.
Ultimately, the goal of TIF is to attract investment from private companies and sectors to
achieve economic development.
1.3.5

Trends in TIF and the Present Status of TIF

In 1952, California became the first state to begin using TIF (Lefcoe & Swenson,
2014). After TIF was authorized, many states began using TIF, leading to a dramatic
increase in its implementation during the 1970s and 1980s (Greenbaum & Landers,
2014). California passed Proposition 13 in 1978, which limited local governments’ ability
to increase property taxes for tax revenues (Dardia, 1998). Proposition 13 directed
municipalities to find alternative policy tools for capital improvement (Lefcoe &
Swenson, 2014). Before TIF, municipalities had three options to encourage
redevelopment. The first option was the abatement of property taxes. The second was for
cities to use fund project that are not included in general funds. The third option was to
issue general obligation bonds (Weber, 2010). In this regard, tax reform was a catalyst for
the proliferation of TIF.
Currently, the District of Columbia and 49 states have diverse forms of TIF
totaling thousands of TIF districts in the United States (Krohe & Boyanoski, 2007;
Lester, 2014). For example, the city of Chicago has 145 TIF districts (Spielman, 2015).
Chicago experienced a $400 million increase in tax revenues, which was used to finance
reimbursement (Spielman, 2015). In 1999, Arizona became the first state to repeal TIF
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legislation (Weber & O’Neill-Kohl, 2013). In 2012, California ended the use of TIF
(Lefcoe & Swenson, 2014). First, the state of Arizona repealed the TIF legislation
because the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the legislation was unconstitutional
(Lefcoe, 2010). Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that a more stringent inquiry was
necessary to argue the public purpose of TIF projects. Second, the state of California
ended the use of TIF for practical reasons. When the state government decided to end the
use of TIF, the state had 425 redevelopment agencies involved in the project (Thomas,
2012). These agencies typically oversaw projects to the value of approximately $8 billion
every year. This total TIF project value exceeded the permissible range of the state
government because the state government had declared a fiscal emergency in 2010. Many
local governments still use TIF as a first option among incentive programs. Even so, the
TIF reversal in California has had serious implications for TIF policy. In other words, the
time is right to conduct a review of the TIF policy tool.
Table 1.2 and Figure 1.3 below show sources of eligible tax revenue by state. All
states use property tax revenues to capture tax increments. We suggest that the success or
failure of TIF policy closely depends on whether property values within each district
increased after the implementation of TIF. The next highest eligible source is sales tax
revenues. Sixteen states use property tax and sales tax revenues for TIF sources. If a state
uses sales tax as a revenue source, the projects will be closely related to retail TIFs. This
policy decision involves two issues: (1) the difficulty of predicting sales tax revenue; and
(2) that variation causes greater risk regarding the sustainability of tax revenue.
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Figure 1.3 Eligible revenue sources by state
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PILOT

Table 1.2 Tax increment finance state-by-state
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Year
Authorized
1987
2001
N/A
2001
1952
1975
1959
2002
1969
1985
1985
1987
1977
1981
1969
1976
2000
1988
1977
1980
2003
1975
1979
1986
1982
1974
1978
1959
1979
2009
2006
1984
2004
1973
1976
1992
1960
1990
1956
1984
1978
1978
1983
1968
1985
1988
2001
2002
1975
1983

Property tax
✓
✓

Eligible Tax Revenue Source
Sales tax
PILOTs

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

TIF counts

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

Unknown
1
0
9
743
140
4
0
222
64
Unknown
78
1238
700 to 800
3340
11
23
9
483
28
Unknown
634
1719
25
468
50
828
22
32
49
16
2
3
48
1278
48
244
Unknown
5
17
172
29
1378
84
9
9
38
31
1241
Unknown

Source: Tax increment Finance State-by-State Report by Council of Development Finance Agencies
(CDFA) (Merriman, Qiao, & Zhao, 2018).

23

1.4

Literature Review: Classification of Previous Studies on TIF

Many previous TIF studies have been conducted in magazines, newspaper
articles, books, and academic journal articles. In addition, many references have been
accumulated over time. This paper will mainly address recent empirical studies. Most
previous studies have focused on output or outcomes of TIF in specific municipalities.
Some studies have also analyzed the effects of TIF on tax revenues, employment growth,
and sales. This review will begin by examining the previous studies that have analyzed
land valuation. Next, the effect of TIF on other outcomes will be reviewed. To do this,
previous findings will be placed into appropriate categories.

1.4.1

Land Valuation Studies

Many studies have closely analyzed the effect of TIF on land valuation. As an
economic development tool, the influence of TIF on real estate value is a key topic in
academic debate (Weber, 2003). Some studies have found that the adoption of TIF had a
positive impact on overall property values (Anderson, 1990; Dardia, 1998; Man &
Rosentraub, 1998; Wassmer & Anderson, 2001; Yadavalli & Landers, 2017). For
example, Anderson (1990) found that cities that adopted TIF experienced greater growth
in property values compared to cities without TIF. However, not all studies that have
analyzed the effects of TIF on property values have found the same result. For instance, a
few studies have concluded that TIF projects failed to increase property values because
TIF projects did not offset investment costs (Dardia, 1998; Merriman, Skidmore, &
Kashian, 2011). However, Dye and Merriman (2000) found that municipalities with TIF
saw an increase in property values while property value growth in municipalities with
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TIF was lower than in municipalities without TIF. These mixed results have led to the
continuation of controversy over the effects of TIF.
1.4.2

Building Valuation Studies

Compared to land valuation studies, fewer studies have analyzed the effect of TIF
on building values. Smith (2006) found that the values of buildings located in TIF
districts showed greater rates of property value growth than buildings in districts without
TIF. In their study of Chicago, Byrne (2006) found that TIF projects led to about a 30%
faster growth rate in property value than in areas without TIF projects. Weber, Bhatta,
and Merriman (2003) also analyzed the Chicago area. They classified buildings into three
categories: industrial, commercial, and residential properties. They found that industrial
buildings in mixed-use districts showed greater property value growth rates than other
building types (Weber et al., 2003). This research did not produce consistent results,
however. For example, Merriman et al. (2011) found no significant growth rate for
industrial and residential properties. The mixed and limited results of studies
investigating the effects of TIF projects on property values suggest a need for future
research.
1.4.3

Unit of Analysis

Early studies on TIF have usually analyzed the effects of TIF projects on specific
municipalities. More specifically, these early studies have compared municipalities that
have TIF projects with municipalities that do not have TIF projects (Anderson, 1990; Dye
& Merriman, 2000; Man & Rosentraub, 1998). For example, using the municipalities of
Michigan as a case study, Anderson (1990) found that cities with TIF showed greater
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growth rates in property value than cities without TIF. Man and Rosentraub (1998) also
used the city as their unit of analysis, finding the same result in Indiana as the Anderson
study found in Michigan. (Dye & Merriman, 2000) achieved consistent results by using
TIF area as a unit of analysis. This method is logical because it directly compares the
effects of TIF. However, using TIF districts is not easy because it is difficult to collect
observational data about TIF projects and to find non-TIF areas with similar conditions.
To increase the validity of their results, recent studies have used the propensity score
matching method (Funderburg, 2018).
A few studies have used census data to control for the demographic characteristics
of the TIF district. Representative of such a research approach is Lester (2014), which
used block group level to analyze the effects of the TIF district. According to his paper,
block group data is a reasonable unit of analysis because it enables researcher to combine
socioeconomic and demographic data with other data (Lester, 2014). Gibson (2003) used
census tract data when analyzing Chicago TIF areas. When used in this way, census
geographic data has clear research benefits. Furthermore, when demographic information
is necessary, multiple datasets can be included. On the other hand, there is a problem with
this data because it might be difficult to match block group or census tract data to TIF
project areas. It is always possible that TIF projects will have different sizes than census
tracts indicate.
Lastly, some studies have used parcel level data as a unit of analysis. For instance,
Weber et al. (2003) analyzed the effects of TIF in Chicago by using parcel levels.
According to their study, the effect of TIF projects could differ depending on the type of
parcel used, such as industrial, residential, or commercial (Weber et al., 2003).
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This review of previous studies suggests that there are several ways to estimate
the effects of TIF projects. Nonetheless, most studies have used property value as the key
element for analyzing the effects of TIF. This is because it provides researchers with
direct information. In future studies, it would be useful to understand the strength of each
data level.
1.4.4

Economic Development Outcomes

Previous studies have analyzed the economic development outcomes of TIF
projects. Man (1999) analyzed Indiana municipalities between 1985 and 1992 and found
a positive relationship between TIF projects and local employment. Wassmer (1994),
whose study was conducted in Detroit, analyzed more economic development outcomes
than did Man (1999). These included sales in manufacturing and retail, as well as
employment. It was also conducted over a longer period (1947–1997). Wassmer (1994)
found that TIF projects had statistically significant and positive impacts on retail
employment rates and retail sales. However, modern studies have conflicted with
previous studies. For example, Byrne (2010) studied Illinois cities between 1981 and
1999 to analyze the effects of TIF and found that TIF projects had a negative impact on
retail employment in general. However, when he focused on industrial development, his
findings showed a positive relationship between employment and TIF projects.
Moreover, Lester (2014) analyzed business creation and employment in Chicago between
1990 and 2008 by using block group data and the propensity score matching method. He
did not find any effect of TIF on employment and private investment. Although some
studies have analyzed economic development outcomes, the results were mixed regarding
TIF projects.
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1.4.5

Fiscal Outcomes

Some studies have analyzed the effects of TIF on fiscal outcomes, such as tax
revenues. These studies have usually compared the cost of the TIF project with increases
in revenues. Huddleston (1981) examined 16 TIF projects in the Wisconsin area from the
1970s. According to his projected estimate, only 10 of 16 local governments would break
even within 20 years. Dardia (1998) examined the California TIF districts to analyze how
TIF impacted the property tax increment. He used a control group that did not adopt TIF
projects to analyze the true TIF effect. He found that less than 25% of TIF districts
recovered more than their TIF costs or broke even (Dardia, 1998). Kriz (2001) used a
Monte Carlo simulation to analyze the effect of TIF on fiscal outcomes based on several
assumptions about public expenditure, tax rates, property value growth, and other policies
regarding local Minnesota governments. Based on these reasonable assumptions, he
concluded that local governments with TIF projects were likely to experience financial
loss (Kriz, 2001). These previous studies suggest that TIF projects are not likely to
generate a net gain for their municipalities. In other words, many local governments have
failed to enjoy the expected effects of TIF. Greenbaum and Landers (2014) suggested two
reasons: (1) There is a possibility that growth in property values may have occurred
regardless of TIF projects; (2) Other economic development tools that do not include TIF
led to the growth in property values. At the same time, they argued that TIF could have
an impact on income, business activity, and employment (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014).
A few studies have supported this argument, claiming that TIF has a positive impact on
business establishment, employment, and sales activity (Byrne, 2010; Lester, 2014; Man,
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1999; Wassmer, 1994). In conclusion, for accurate assessment, more comprehensive
analyses that include other tax revenues are needed.
1.4.6

Evaluation of Previous TIF Studies

A substantial body of research has analyzed the effectiveness of TIF in
municipalities. Many studies have also evaluated the TIF system itself. Overall, there is a
great deal of support for TIF. First, municipalities may have greater tax revenues due to
TIF projects (Nguyen-Hoang, 2018). Such increases in tax revenues are the principal
reason for the diffusion of TIF. Second, TIF has been evaluated as a flexible tool because
TIF-related decisions are typically made at the local level without approval of state or
federal government (Greifer, 2005). For example, enterprise zone programs as well as
state and federal grant programs require several time-consuming approval and application
processes. The relative flexibility of TIF enables local governments to more easily adopt
TIF programs. Third, TIF is a “self-financing” policy tool. This is because the increased
property tax base brought about by TIF could be devoted entirely to expenditure on
public infrastructure. This strength could be appealing to local governments reluctant to
increase the tax burden (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). Lastly, TIF enables municipalities
to avoid the debt limit. Many states still limit the amount of debt in local government, and
a complicated process is required for a municipality to issue more. However, if a local
government links a TIF project to a special revenue obligation, the bonds are not
perceived as “debt” (Selby & Hunter, 2004). Many previous studies have pointed to these
advantages. If a TIF district did not exist, developers would have to pay infrastructure
costs. TIF ensures that property taxes are used to pay for infrastructure that directly
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benefits the developer’s property or business. In this sense, TIF functions as an incentive
for private investors to invest in a specific location (Leavitt, Morris, & Lombard, 2008).
Despite these advantages, several problems with TIF have been discussed in
previous studies. First, TIF projects could lead to financial crises for local governments.
For example, if a TIF project did not produce a proper future tax increment, there is a
possibility that local governments might experience worsening crises or even default
(Kane & Weber, 2016). Second, more diverse evaluation criteria are necessary for TIF
programs in the short and long term. This is because property value growth does not
represent the overall effect of TIF. For instance, increasing property values could
decrease wellbeing for residents because it could force tenants to leave their homes
(Hackworth, 2002; Newman & Wyly, 2006). In short, there are concerns regarding
inequity between property owners and tenants. A third criticism is that it takes a long
time for the expected outcomes of TIF projects to occur. TIF projects are usually
conducted over long periods of at least ten years. Opponents of TIF programs have
pointed out this problem, arguing that lengthy project periods increase program
uncertainty (Hipler, 2007).

1.5

Summary and Recommendations

As with other economic development incentives, TIF is aimed at economic
growth and the revitalization of blighted areas. According to previous studies, local
governments might benefit from increased growth in income, private investment, and
employment if TIF projects achieve their goals. However, previous studies of property
value have had mixed results. Outcomes have been similar regarding fiscal and economic
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development. According to Weber and Goddeeris (2007) , “research on the effect of TIF
has raised more questions than it has answered” (p. 54). This statement reflects the
current status of TIF studies and economic development policies. At the same time, this
situation brings into question why local governments have adopted economic
development policies that have uncertainty about the result. This is the most urgent task
in the economic development academic area because previous studies have not provided
an answer in detail or even produced any issues about the reason.
The literature review identified several directions for future study and
recommendations for practitioners and researchers. According to Kane and Weber
(2016), further studies of TIF projects are essential because there is still doubt regarding
whether TIF leads to property value growth. Greenbaum and Landers (2014) made the
same point, also arguing that it is necessary to analyze the overall economic impact of
TIF on municipalities. Bartels & Hall (2012) argued that too few studies have analyzed
how internal management practices impact TIF performance. When TIF projects are
established, local government officials intend certain goals for the project. Yadavalli and
Landers (2017) claimed that this practice leads to inherent bias, recommending that an
improved research method is essential to address such bias. In this regard, more detailed
and comprehensive studies employing advanced methods are needed.
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CHAPTER 2. A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR A ZERO-SUM DILEMMA AND THE DIFFUSION
MECHANISM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES (TAX INCREMENT FINANCE)

Abstract
Tax increment finance (TIF) is intended to increase economic activity in a local
area. TIF has spread rapidly in recent years in America to become an essential part of the
policies of American local government. Research finds little evidence of aggregate
effects on total production, consistent with TIF as a zero-sum game for local
government. The popularity of TIF results from local governments competing with or
learning from other local governments, imposing fiscal externalities on each other. The
theory is similar to the race to the bottom in costly activities like welfare spending and in
tax cuts which result in fiscal stress on local government activity. Although little attention
has been paid to political factors in economic development policies, they are theoretically
closely related to the adoption and extent of fiscal incentives.
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2.1

Introduction

Economic development incentives are currently the most common tool adopted by
local and state governments (Pew Center Report, 2012). The reason why this policy tool
became trendy is that economic development incentives tend to promise rosy futures such
as creating jobs, economic growth, and attracting investment. Indeed, according to a
recent New York Times investigation on incentives, the total number of incentive
programs is 1,874, and state governments have spent about $80.4 billion per year on them
(Story, Fehr, & Watkins, 2012). These economic development policies have become an
essential part of the policies of American local governments (Fleischmann, Green, &
Kwong, 1992), leading to many empirical studies that analyzed the effects of
development policies (Wang, 2016). However, this prior academic literature fails to
suggest a clear direction on the effectiveness of economic development incentives.
At the same time, the popularity of these policies gives rise to strategic interaction
between state and local governments. To be precise, a state’s or municipality’s policies
indirectly impact other local governments’ choices. As a result, this strategic behavior
causes state and local governments to compete via the adoption of incentives and taxes to
win the game. Although many empirical studies about tax competition exist, their results
do not reach any consensus (Leiser, 2017). However, there is a comparative lack of
theoretical studies that analyze why economic development policies are structurally and
actively adopted by local governments. While many studies have analyzed the effects of
economic development policies, surprisingly little research has been conducted to explain
which factors are associated with the extent of the use of economic development policies.
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Furthermore, these economic policies face a “zero-sum dilemma” (Snow, 1995).
For example, economic development incentives yield no significant changes regarding
overall local economic growth indicators, such as the total number of jobs (Sridhar,
1996). Several studies also suggest tax incentive policies are considered a zero-sum game
(Chrinko & Wilson, 2008; Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000; Wilson, 2009). To the best of my
knowledge, no studies have analyzed how a zero-sum game could be modeled in
economic development policies. In this sense, it is necessary to question whether
economic policies structurally lead to net benefits in local areas.
This article intends to theoretically examine the proposition that tax increment
finance (TIF) is a zero sum game, as TIF is the most popular economic policy tool (Man
& Rosentraub, 1998), by applying the zero-sum dilemma to TIF and analyzing why the
project does not produce the intended outcome. Additionally, the study theoretically
highlights the diffusion mechanism of economic development policies by using TIF,
specifically examining why adopting TIF in a community leads to TIF adoptions in other
communities. Lastly, based on existing political theories, this article explains
theoretically why local governments that political actors are involved with cannot desist
from using diverse economic development policies such as TIF.

2.2

The Characteristics of Economic Development Policy

When state and local governments adopt economic development policies, they
expect to create something new, such as increasing investments and jobs. However, many
studies do not draw conclusions about the effectiveness of economic development
policies (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014; Patrick, 2014; Swann, 2017). There is even the
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argument that economic development policies have a negative impact on the national
economy (Burstein & Rolnick, 1995). Specifically, the competitive adoption of economic
development policies causes the under-provision of public service, as these policies only
relocate investments and businesses across locations (Bartik, 1991; Fisher & Peters,
1997; Wang, 2016). Thus, a few studies on economic development have recognized
policy effects as a zero-sum game (Chrinko & Wilson, 2008; Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000;
Wilson, 2009). In this situation, we face questions regarding the reasons state and local
governments have scrambled to implement economic development policies.
We can easily understand the characteristics of economic development policy if
we review the process of policy adoption. At the start of the process, as one state adopts a
new economic development policy, the probability of other states adopting the same
policy is increased because other state residents hear of the expected benefits (Leiser,
2017). These states also start to experience the loss of wealth, that is, the zero-sum nature
of damage because of the new policy. As time goes on, the comparative benefits of the
economic development policy decrease because several other states adopted the same
policy. In other words, early adopters can no longer enjoy their once unique benefits.
Additionally, states that do not adopt the new policy try to differentiate from other states
that have already adopted the policy by using other policies to attract new investors;
indeed, the probability of adoption begins to decrease after a short peak time, with
economic development policies tending to show an inverted U-shape adoption
probability. This repeating process indicates that state governments recognize the use of
economic development policies as a zero-sum game (Leiser, 2017).
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2.3

The Purpose of Applying the Theory of Zero-Sum Games to TIF

TIF is regarded as a powerful tool for local development. Private or public
investment in underprivileged areas that are less likely to attract new investment or
businesses without policy intervention proceed with TIF to achieve their goals. Most
previous studies focused on the output or outcomes of TIF in certain municipalities. More
specifically, these studies tended to review how property value changes after TIF
implementation (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). The reason for this is that growth in
property value is the key mechanism to maintain the virtuous circle of TIF. However,
many property value studies have had different results.
The diffusion of TIF is the same as with other economic development policies. As
discussed above, only a few states adopt TIF in the early stage, though most states have
already adopted other TIF policies to keep from being left behind in the current economic
situation. Still, TIF is clearly evaluated as a zero-sum game in previous research (Snow,
1995). Taking this into consideration, it is reasonable to theoretically test the
characteristics of a TIF policy as a representation of economic development policies.

2.4

Theoretical Model for a Zero-Sum Dilemma

The present study is based on a theoretical model of public infrastructure
(Boarnet, 1998) , but it has been slightly modified to apply to a TIF case. This portion
designs a model of TIF in two cities, labeled A and B. Each city has a public authority
and both public authorities produce identical local outputs, such as public services with
identical technologies. The local output of each public authority is evaluated by the
national market at price p. I also assume that supply of capital and labor are perfectly
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inelastic in each city in the short run. In the long run, both factors of local outputs can
freely move between cities. Finally, total economic activities, such as jobs and
businesses, are in fixed supply, as nothing is created that does not already exist. To focus
on the effect of TIF, I also assume that there is no cost for providing public capital and F
is a neoclassical production function. 1
Based on previous assumptions, each city produces public local outputs to
residents according to
Q = (G)F(L,K),
where
Q = city or local output,
G = public capital,
L = labor force,
K = physical capital,
In this situation, I assume that City A increases public capital due to the TIF
project. The increased public capital with TIF will provide benefits for the owners of
physical capital and workers in the short run. During this process, City A generally issues
debt, such as revenue bonds, to cover the cost of increasing public capital. Thus, the
increase in the amount of public capital is equal to the debt (D).

1

The neoclassical production F(K,L) has the following properties: (1) Both factors are necessary, (2) both
factors contribute to output, and (3) the production exhibits constant returns to scale.
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In the long run, the increased public capital with the TIF project will be attractive
to labor and physical capital in City B. As a result, factors (L, K) will migrate from City
B to City A in the long run to get benefits. After the shift of factors is complete, the two
cities’ local output is
QA = (GA+ G-D)F(LA + L, KA + K)

G = D

QB = (GB)F(LB - L, KA- K)
Given that the TIF project in City A leads to local output increases in City A and
decreases in City B, the above model demonstrates the basic logic of a zero-sum dilemma
in a TIF project. Figure 2.1 shows the TIF program is necessarily located in the zero-sum
line, a non-positive and non-negative sum area. Accordingly, this study proposes the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A tax increment financing project is a zero-sum game among
municipalities.
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Figure 2.1 Zero-sum dilemma in TIF

2.5

The Diffusion of Economic Development Policy

States have been recognized as “laboratories of democracy” because state
governments can experiment with diverse policies more than the federal government can
due to considerable discretion in making public policy (Hearn, Lacy, & Warshaw, 2014).
A state government’s novel innovation allows public officials to try experiments which
have high-risk to implement nationwide. If a state government or local government’s new
policy is successful, the diffusion of the policy may occur both vertically and
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horizontally, enabling these governments to learn from other state governments’
experiments.
2.5.1

The Definition of Innovation and Diffusion

State and local governments usually try various attempts to address social
problems. Although most governmental actions are incremental in that they marginally
change budgets and programs, some governments pursue innovation (Berry & Berry,
2014). If we only analyze the incremental governmental actions, we cannot say that we
understand policymaking because there are few innovative actions. When we usually
think about innovation, we usually come up with something new as an innovation.
However, in the policy area, innovation means that “governmental jurisdiction can
innovate by adopting a program numerous other jurisdictions established many years
before” (Berry & Berry, 2014, p.307).
After a state or local government adopts a new policy, other governments tend to
follow the innovation. In that way, the innovation can spread nationwide. This process is
called the diffusion of policy, which is defined as “the process by which an innovation is
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social
system” (Berry & Berry, 2014, p.307). The same thing is happening with TIF,
considering the growth in the number of states with the TIF since California adopted it. In
this sense, the innovation and diffusion model could apply to TIF.
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2.5.2

The General Mechanism for Diffusion

Many researchers have analyzed what leads to the diffusion of policy. At least
four mechanisms have been discerned: learning from adopters, competition among
nearby cities, imitation, and coercion by state governments (Shipan & Volden, 2008).
First, learning leads to diffusion. State governments and public officials face
diverse social problems. In this situation, collecting all of the information related to the
problems and identifying all of the alternatives seem to be ideal. In reality, it is
impossible to rationally compare all of the options for finding an optimal alternative
because of time and budget restrictions. These constraints make governments focus on
the learning process (Berry & Berry, 2014). The learning process means that policy
decision makers make an effort to find a policy that has already proven successful when
they address their own social problems.
Second, competition can lead to diffusion. Competition is often compared to
learning to clarify its meaning. Competition refers to individuals who are living near state
borders, while learning usually occurs across states generally (Berry & Baybeck, 2005).
Considering the nature of interconnectivity in the US, policy makers are more likely to
adopt a policy if their neighboring states have it. However, there is evidence to suggest
that adjacent state competition has not statistically influenced adoption (Hearn et al.,
2014; Miller & Richard, 2010). Furthermore, some studies have argued that states or
local governments could easily become susceptible to a “race to the bottom” in
generosity of benefits because of competitive federalism (Volden, 2002). In other words,
the fear of losing local jobs and businesses could lead to the adoption of the policy.
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Third, imitation is one of the mechanisms for diffusion. We can understand the
meaning of imitation through a comparison with learning. Shipan & Volden (2008)
distinguished imitation from learning in the following way: Imitation mainly focuses on
actors, while learning mechanisms concentrate on actions. This means that if a state
government takes an imitation approach, it is more interested in which other governments
adopted the policy than in the policy itself. Thus, the imitation mechanism means that
“government A imitates government B when A adopts a policy simply in order to look
like B” (Shipan & Volden, 2008, p842). Imitation is also called copying or emulation to
resemble other governments.
Fourth, coercion leads to diffusion. Compared to other mechanisms, this
mechanism is marked by compulsion. For example, a central government or state
government could compel a local government through its authority and laws. Coercion
could also originate with horizontal government through international organizations like
the United Nations (Shipan & Volden, 2008). Although there is a horizontal case in terms
of the coercion mechanism, the US federal system provides researchers with more
opportunities to focus on vertical coercion (Berry & Berry, 2014). TIF is not based on
vertical coercion because there is no mandatory regulation and state governments
independently adopt the policy without coercion.
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2.6

The Mechanism of Tax Competition and Economic Development Policy Diffusion
Many state and local governments have attempted to adopt new policies to

promote economic growth and jobs, competing with each other to generate businesses
and households for a long time (Goetz et al., 2011). The origin of this competition is
based on an idea from Tiebout (1956) called theory of efficient tax competition
(Munongo, Akanbi, & Robinson, 2017). This model assumes that there is competition
among municipalities, and this competition leads to the efficiency of public services
(Rendon-Garza, 2006). A model from Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) also provides a
critical theory, called the Z-M model, about tax competition, which is based on several
assumptions: 1) there is a fixed and homogenous community; 2) each community has
inelastic capital and elastic labor; 3) perfect competition and constant returns to scale
technology exist; and 4) governments aim to achieve social optimization between
taxation and public goods. The Z-M model also concludes that tax competition among
communities leads to a shift of tax burden from mobile capital to immobile labor.
Recently, tax competition studies have suggested that state or local governments
compete with each other not only with taxes, but also with economic development
policies (Leiser, 2017). In particular, although geographic proximity is not an important
factor for economic development policy competition (Hearn et al., 2014), other
dimensions such as industry structure facilitate competition among states (Fletcher &
Murray, 2006). Leiser (2017) also suggested that competition actually exists among states
regarding tax incentives, a pattern similar to a race to the bottom.
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2.7

The Goal and Purpose of Application of the Mechanism for Diffusion

Many local governments have adopted TIF for similar reasons. First, local
governments have tended to establish TIF to correct market failure (Greenbaum &
Landers, 2014). Without public intervention, blighted areas will suffer greatly. For
instance, local governments have used TIF to address spatial inequities, such as
concentrated poverty and infrastructure concerns. Second, to improve efficiency, TIF has
been widely used by local governments. Specifically, some local governments have
attempted to foster agglomeration economies to maximize economies of scale through the
TIF (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). Lastly, competition among local governments has led
to the adoption of TIF. In other words, local governments have adopted TIF because of
competition for new investment and business among municipalities (Anderson, 1990;
Man, 1999; Mason & Thomas, 2010). Some researchers have concluded that the
competitive dynamics generated by the TIF policy process justify its adoption. However,
other researchers argue that the amelioration of financial crisis is the main reason to adopt
TIF programs. While this competitive view is often criticized, Byrne (2005) showed that
local governments are less likely to consider neighboring governments’ decisions.
Considering these circumstances, conducting a study about why municipalities adopt TIF
and the mechanism of diffusion would be timely research. Therefore, the following
section aims to apply the diffusion mechanism to TIF in order to analyze why these
projects have spread across the country.
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2.8

Theoretical Model for Diffusion of a TIF

The present study is based on a conceptual Tiebout model and the model of Filer
(1992), but slightly modified.2 The present study also adds a new residential option,
creating a community with a TIF project beyond staying in one’s current place or moving
to an alternative place with a TIF project, as a response to changes in the community’s
TIF policy. Consider two communities, X and Y. The communities are identical in all
aspects, except the fiscal package (e.g., tax rate and level of government services)
provided by a local government. At period t0, each community is comprised of residents
with identical preferences, but the residents in Community X have different preferences
from those in Community Y. Now, suppose that a new TIF project is implemented in the
communities in period t1. The implementation of this new TIF project changes the current
condition of the communities, which eventually changes the utility of residents.
Since residents can freely choose the community in which they live by “voting
with their feet,” some will move to an alternative location if they anticipate that the utility
to be gained from moving is greater than the current community’s utility level. This can
be expressed using the following equation:
Bi = (Ci - C*) - Ri* > (Cj - C*) - Rj*, i ≠ j,
where Ci and Cj represent the location’s benefits including wages, the probability of
employment, the natural environment (e.g., climate), and other advantages. C* represents
the location benefits of the current residential site. Ri* and Rj* represent the costs involved

2

This study is based on several Tiebout Model assumptions, not all. Specifically, (1) residents are perfectly
mobile. (2) residents have full information, and (3) there are no spillovers among communities.
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in moving from the current location to the alternative location. Bi equals 0 if the current
location is optimal for residents.
For example, Resident A in Community X will move to Community Y if (Cy - C*)
- Ry* > (Cx - C*) - Rx*. Otherwise, he or she will stay in Community X. Resident B in
Community Y will also move to Community X if (C x - C*) - Rx* > (Cy - C*) - Ry*.
Otherwise, he or she will stay in Community Y.
However, it is also possible to form a new community rather than choosing
among the existing ones, if the net benefits expected to be gained from a new community
with a new TIF project are greater. Consider a hypothetical Resident C in Community X.
If the implementation of TIF changes their utility, she would consider moving to
Community Y or creating a new Community Z with a new TIF project.
(Cz - C*) - Rz* > (Cy - C*) - Ry*,
where Cz refers to the location benefits for the new Community Z, and Rz* represents the
costs involved in creating a TIF and moving to Community Z. Assume benefits are
distributed continuously so that net benefits for Community Z have probability zero of
being the same as those for Community Y. If there is no difference in the benefits
expected to be gained from each community, people will choose one of the existing
communities rather than creating a new one. If (Cz - C*) - Rz* > (Cy - C*) - Ry*, Resident
C will create a new community with a new TIF project. If (Cy - C*) - Ry* > (Cz - C*) - Rz*,
they will move to Community Y.
Hypothesis 2: The adoption of a tax increment financing project in a community
accelerates the adoption of TIF in other communities.
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2.9

The Influence of Political Factors in Economic Development Policies

Two main theories, structure and agency, have competed with each other to
explain the adoption and extent of economic development policies. This continuing
debate about economic development policy has led to the development of several
theoretical and case studies (Kantor, 1988; Wong, 1988).
First, the basic assumption of structural theory is that social and economic
conditions determine economic development policies. One of the typical examples of
structural theory is an economic condition in which a local government heavily depends
on manufacturing (Fleischmann, Green, & Kwong, 1992). Unemployment and poverty
rates are also included as components of structural theory; Peterson (1981) argues that
local governments make an effort to improve these social indicators to maintain their
socioeconomic position among other governments. Additionally, public officials usually
feel a great deal of pressure regarding these structural indicators because residents are
likely to ask them to do something if they face poor local conditions. Thus, structural
theory argues that socioeconomic indicators are key determinants of the adoption and
extent of economic development policies.
Human agency theory, meanwhile, mainly focuses on specific actors. One
example of this argument is growth machines theory, which claims that actors who profit
from community growth play an important role in shaping economic development
policies (Fleischmann et al., 1992); for instance, politicians, retailers, realtors, and
mortgage companies are actors who are deeply involved in local development. A related
aspect of this agency theory is political leadership. Specifically, a mayor-council system
is more likely to adopt development policies because mayors tend to be more responsive
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and sensitive than politicians in a council-manager system (Feiock & Clingermayer,
1986).
Previous studies have mainly focused on structural factors such as socioeconomic
indicators. On the contrary, only a few studies have analyzed the political factors that are
closely related to economic development policies, even though these factors play
important roles in shaping policies (Betz et al., 2012). In this sense, this study
theoretically examines why these political factors are important in this field and how they
influence the adoption and extent of economic development policies.
2.9.1

Political Actors

As discussed above, political actors are closely associated with economic
development policies. The reason why political actors continuously adopt and use
incentives is that this decision and behavior are rational. Specifically, the political
rationality model claims that the adoption and use of economic development policies can
provide an opportunity for public officials and political actors to appeal to their residents
(Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001; Sharp, 1991). This policy tool is very useful when elected
officials want to strengthen their political positions. Similarly, using economic
development policy is an instrument for credit-claiming (Feiock & Clingermayer, 1986).
When a local area faces an economic recession or difficulties, elected officials receive
much pressure from their residents, and constituent groups ask them to do something. In
this situation, Feiock (1986) suggests that economic development policies are effective
and politically advantageous to elected officials because they are visible projects. Thus,
people easily recognize through them that elected officials are doing something for the
community, regardless of a policy’s true effectiveness.
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There may be a question of why local elected officials actively use economic
development policies even if their effectiveness is uncertain. This behavior is also
explained by elected officials’ rationality, as it is rational to assume that local elected
officials mainly focus on their activities’ impact on their local area. In other words, local
elected officials are not concerned with the zero-sum characteristics of fiscal incentives at
the state or national level. From their point of view, attracting and inducing investments
for employment bring them political benefits, and that is enough for them. In this regard,
this study concludes that elected local officials rationally use economic development
policies.
2.9.2

Political System

There is no doubt that there would be different economic development strategies
if each local government had significant differences. This general assumption is the same
for political systems. For instance, Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez (2005) suggest that the
form of government is one explanation for the variation in economic development
policies. Unlike other countries, the U.S. has an especially unusual local government
system, where local residents can choose their local government structure. Thus, it is
expected that this difference in government structure influences the adoption and extent
of economic development policies. Although there are several types of government,
many previous studies primarily focus on two: the mayor-council and council-manager
systems.
The main difference between these two systems is based on the role of the mayor
and manager in each system. The mayor-council system is more responsive than the
council-manager system because the former implies that mayors are more likely to be
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sensitive to local demands to win the next election compared to managers who work in a
council-manager system. Although this condition could lead to positive results in local
areas, such as innovative practices and citizen participation (Nelson & Svara, 2012; Yang
& Callahan, 2011), the mayor-council system permits the reckless use of fiscal
incentives.
On the other hand, city managers in the council-manager system tend to pursue
professional goals and long-term economic development (Feiock, Jeong, & Kim, 2003).
This is because managers do not have incentives for elections. In this sense, managers are
highly likely to deal with economic development policies from a more calculated point of
view and are expected to constrain the indiscriminate use of fiscal incentives.
Based on these difference in political systems, this study asserts that there are
significant variations between these two government structures. The mayor-council
system may be positively associated with the adoption and extent of economic
development policies.
2.9.3

Political Climate and Ideology

There are two theories that relate to the political climate over economic
development policies. First, due to fiscal policy interdependence, municipalities and
states do not make independent policy decisions in isolation. Rather, local governments
tend to consider and review other governments’ current policies carefully within a system
of fiscal policy interdependence (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2003). This indirect fiscal
policy interdependence also triggers a specific state mood and opinion regarding
economic development policies. Thus, when local governments make a decision
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regarding fiscal incentives, there is a possibility that they could be swayed by strong
public opinion. Second, the yardstick competition theory assumes that there is an
information externality among local governments (Besley & Case, 1992). Specifically,
voters who receive imperfect information about other local government policies evaluate
their current government using this information as a reference point for this information
and then tend to pressure incumbents accordingly. This information externality thereby
accelerates fiscal competition among jurisdictions (Besley & Case, 1995; Bordignon,
Cerniglia, & Revelli, 2003; Ermini & Santolini, 2007; Solé-Ollé, 2003). Finally, this
information externality forms the basis of strong political pressure for the adoption and
extent of the use of economic incentives.
Additionally, some studies have indicated that political ideology could have an
influence on economic development policy choices. Generally, Democrats are more
likely to support government interventions in the economy and are reluctant to create
benefits for companies without concomitant job creation (Betz et al., 2012). Republicans
usually take a different position to Democrats on economic development policies.
Republicans support the notion of helping business, but they do not prefer to help pick
winners (Betz et al., 2012). A few studies have analyzed the relationship between specific
fiscal incentives and ideology. Notably, Lewis (2002) found that there is a negative
relationship between Democratic Party strength and retail development incentives.
Similarly, Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt (2006) ascertained that Democratic Party strength
has a negative impact on industrial recruitment and entrepreneurial strategies. Given the
current situation, more research is needed because the literature does not offer a clear
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answer regarding the general relationship between the most frequently used economic
development policies and ideology.
In summary, based on previous studies, we can deduce that political factors play
an important role in shaping economic development policies, including TIF. Figure 2.2
provides an implicit view of the importance of political factors. There is a relative lack of
empirical studies analyzing the relationship between local political factors and fiscal
incentives compared to such analyses in socioeconomic factor studies.

Structural Theory
Unemployment
rate
Poverty rate

The adoption
and extent of the
use economic
development
policies

Manufacturing

Political Factors
Individual

System
Political climate
and ideology

Figure 2.2 The relationship between determinants and the adoption and extent of the use
of economic development policies
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2.10 Theoretical Extensions
As discussed, most state and local governments adopt economic development
policies. If we have to describe the current situation, we must first refer to Rubin (1988),
which states, “Shoot anything that flies; claim anything that falls” (p. 236). Although
most studies concentrate on the effectiveness of economic development policies, they fail
to give us clear answers on why. In addition, these studies do not explain why local
governments structurally and actively use economic policies and why we get mixed
effectiveness results. This study has attempted to answer these two questions.
The first model shows that a TIF project contains the characteristics of a zero-sum
game. In other words, the implementation of TIF may not have positive impacts on the
local area. This is consistent with some previous literature. However, there are some
studies that contain opposing arguments (Anderson, 1990; Dardia, 1998; Man &
Rosentraub, 1998; Wassmer & Anderson, 2001; Yadavalli & Landers, 2017). In this
regard, further empirical studies are needed to test this proposition. The second model
implies that each community can be composed of people with homogeneous preferences
if they reach an equilibrium. If Community Y offers a TIF project that people find
attractive, then some groups of residents in X (e.g., small business owners, private
investors, etc.) will respond by moving to an alternative place. At the same time, some
groups of residents in X and Y could leave their communities because a TIF project in
Community Y changes their utilities. They are likely to try to cooperate with other people
to create a new community with a new TIF project that meets their preferences. This
theoretical logic could explain a considerable portion of the current diffusion of TIF.
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There is a need for empirical studies to clarify the mechanism of TIF adoption.
The third part provides a theoretical explanation of how political factors are associated
with economic development polices. This study found that there is a relative lack of
research on the political determinants of fiscal incentives because the previous literature
does not indicate a general relationship, even though political factors play an important
role in economic development policies. Studies that include political factors in the model
are therefore needed in this field
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CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENT ON THE
UTILIZATION OF BUSINESS INCENTIVES

Abstract
To analyze the effects of competition and the forms of government on the utilization of
business incentives at the local government level, this study focuses on two major
incentives: tax credit and tax increment financing. The statistical results show that the
competition mechanisms operate differently for each of the incentives. More specifically,
the council-manager system considerably constrains the overall adoption and extent of
use of business incentives. These results could indicate the prevalence of a particular
form of government for economic development policies.
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3.1

Introduction

As in most countries, economic development is repeatedly an important and highly
competitive issue in the United States (U.S.) (Hawkins, 2017). This observation of the
current situation is supported by the fact that U.S. municipalities commonly offer at least
one economic development policy to induce business investment. In addition, state and
local governments have spent large budgetary amounts to offer economic development
incentives to potential businesses (Wang, 2018). Even the recent economic recession has
not affected this upward trend. For instance, . In 2017, there was fierce competition
among the states when Toyota and Mazda revealed that they will build a new plant that
would be expected to create 4,000 quality jobs (Boudette, 2018). According to latest
news, over 10 states—among those are Kentucky, Alabama, North Carolina, and
Michigan—joined the bid to attract the investment. Toyota and Mazda revealed that they
received incentive packages of at least 1 billion dollars (Boudette, 2018) . This appears to
be a classic example of competition among state governments in terms of economic
development policies. The recent Toyota–Mazda case is a typical example of
competition. However, governments do not always compete against each other in all
program projects. NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) is an example of such cases. For
instance, the city of Vancouver planned Rain City housing aimed at providing houses for
people who suffer from addictions, mental illness, and other challenges. When this
project was released, many residents were concerned about safety and were therefore
resisting such changes (Woo, 2012). These extreme cases show that governments and
residents have different attitudes toward economic development policies, depending on
the type of development plan and its expected benefits. At the same time, this field is
facing strong criticism because of the indiscreet behavior of local governments.
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According to some studies, local governments tend to adopt and use business incentives
without adopting any specific tactic (Grady, 1987; Wolman, 1988). It seems that offering
a competitive mechanism for the purpose of maintaining or improving an economic
position is made largely in spite of strong doubt that economic development policies
overall are effective. For example, the metaphor of an arms race is used to describe the
current situation, in which “shopping lists” for policy options almost always favor the
promotion of the local economy and winning the competition at all costs. This situation is
similar to the idea of a “race to the bottom” (Buss, 2001; Koven & Lyons, 2006). Given
these conditions, it is undeniable that having an economic development policy has
become the agenda that draws the most attention from the financial sector. As the
popularity of economic development policies has grown, it becomes imperative to
understand the logic that motivates business incentives.
Regarding current trends, two problems can arise. There is a strong likelihood that
when local governments make a decision, they do not carefully consider the unique
conditions and variations of their particular situation (Fleischmann et al., 1992). The
second problem is that there are no widely accepted explanations for variations of
economic development policies among the municipalities. Although structure and agency
theories compete with each other, the literature has so far been unable to reach a definite
conclusion.
To keep up with the flow, many previous studies have analyzed how local
governments develop their own features in determining the adoption and extending the
offer of an economic development incentive (Felix & Hines, 2013). Despite these
articles, little empirical evidence exists whether or not the use of a business incentive is a
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purely financial mechanism or the result of competitive behavior. Specifically, to
estimate the degree to which business incentives are driven by competition, these studies
simply count the number of questionnaire items about the topic (Warner & Zheng, 2013;
Zheng & Warner, 2010). Although this method could indirectly measure the level of
competition, it is difficult to achieve an exact estimate of the competitive level.
Additionally, the number of business incentive programs is used as an indicator of the
extent of economic development policies (Green & Fleischmann, 1991; Sharp, 1991;
Warner & Zheng, 2013). However, none of these approaches reliably measure the extent
to which incentives are used. One main strand of the literature focuses mainly on the
adoption of economic development incentives (Feiock, & Clingermayer, 1992; Felix &
Hines, 2013; Green & Fleischmann, 1991; Zheng & Warner, 2010). These previous
studies have a definite limitation because it is impossible to analyze the degree to which a
community’s characteristics have an influence on the use of business incentives.
To address the limitations of previous studies, this study uses the 2014
International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Economic Development
Survey. Previous studies have usually depended on the ICMA surveys of 1999, 2004, and
2009 to obtain basic information about the business incentives of municipalities. One
main difference between the 2014 and previous surveys is that the 2014 survey changed
its questionnaire items. This change enables us to estimate to what extent competition
influences local government’s decision regarding economic development priorities for
the adoption and extensive use of business incentives. Thus, it is possible that the
conclusions of this study could differ from previous studies.
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To bridge the literature gap, this study is based on unique data that is distinctive
from previous data sets. The paper not only includes structure theory variables but also
adds agency theory variables to compare the degree of effect on the use of business
incentives. This study differentiates the use of business incentives by two representative
types: tax credit and tax increment financing (TIF). Accordingly, this paper aims to
contribute to the field of economic development policy by posing and answering the
following questions: (1) To what extent, if at all, does competition influence the local
government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and affect the
adoption of business incentives? (2) To what extent, if at all, does competition influence
local government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and affect the
extensive use of tax credits and TIF? (3) What impact does the form of government have
on the adoption and extensive use of tax credits and TIF? (4) To what extent, if at all,
does competition influence local government’s decision regarding economic development
priorities as concerns the total number of business incentives? Additionally, this study
analyzes the causal relationship between explanatory variables and the utilization of
business incentives. A few studies have supported that independent variables, such as
competition, government structure, and change in political leadership, have a significant
impact on economic development policies. However, it is difficult to find studies that
support that economic development policies have an impact on the competition of local
governments, form of government, and government ideology. In this regard, the main
purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the causal relationship and not the correlation.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The first section is a brief
explanation of economic development policy trends and reviews the previous studies
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about competition for development between municipalities and the general determinants
of business incentive policies, as well as the foremost theories. The next section presents
the data and method, and the paper concludes with a summary of the results and a
discussion of the noteworthy implications.

3.2
3.2.1

Literature Review

Factors that Affect the Extensive Use of Business Incentives

Questions have been repeatedly raised about why local governments still use business
incentives for economic development, given some concern in the field about the
effectiveness of the policy. Several scholars have tried to answer these questions. For
instance, political calculation, economic, and fiscal conditions have an impact on the
adoption of business incentives (Fisher & Peters, 1998; Wolman, 1988). Additionally,
previous studies point out that inconclusive studies on the effectiveness of incentives
have led to encouraging the use of such policies among municipalities (Bartik, 2003;
Lynch, 2004). At the same time, many local governments are still reluctant to offer
business incentives. This is because local governments take account of the risk of revenue
loss, doubtful effectiveness, and calculations of profit and loss for such policies (Felix &
Hines, 2013). Although some governments already know the mixed results of the
ineffectiveness of business, they continue using incentives because of the footloose
nature of investment and the widespread popularity of incentives (Bartik, 2005; Lynch,
2004). In this regard, this paper examines the extent of the effect of competition on the
decision-making of municipalities regarding economic development priorities;
specifically, the aim is to determine the effect of the adoption and extensive use of
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business incentives by comparing incentive users with non-users because few empirical
studies have analyzed the effect of competition on the adoption and extensive use of
business incentives.
Competition
The interaction of capitalism and federalism has given birth to the phenomenon of a
common pool in the economic development policy (Berry, 2008; Bowman, 1988).
Decentralized local governments can freely exploit a shared tax base because federal
government total tax revenues are not important for local governments (Drucker,
Funderburg, Merriman, & Weber, 2020). Many local governments also overlap the tax
base with several jurisdictions at the same time. This local fragmentation and economic
gap among the municipalities force local governments to continuously compete with each
other by the use of business incentives. Thus, we can conclude that business incentives,
including tax credits, aggravate the zero-sum situation because the resources that
municipalities can gain are limited (Hawkins, 2017).
Local governments have two alternatives to overcome the tragedy of a common
pool and zero-sum situation. One is cooperation and the other is competition to win.
However, a local government necessarily chooses competitive behavior instead of
cooperation because the justification for cooperation with other governments will
diminish if the amounts of benefits or gains cannot be shared equably among other
governments (Bowman, 1988). In other words, “Competition is said to occur when
benefits are returned to a subset of the jurisdiction seeking them” (Bowman, 1988,
p.512). Previous studies have already predicted the inevitable consequence of the
jurisdictional competition orientation (Stone, 1984). Tiebout (1956) argues that, in
61

theory, a system of a high level of fragmented local government is necessary to achieve
the optimal level of public service. This fragmentation allows local governments to select
an almost infinite combination of spending and taxes and give almost perfect information
to each resident. This theoretical foundation makes it difficult to choose cooperation
because residents are highly likely to apply considerable pressure on the local
government to follow other governments’ incentive offers. As a practical consideration,
municipalities unavoidably choose competitive behavior. The first reason is that the
almost unlimited mobility of capital leads to the increasing impulse to compete among
the local governments (Hawkins, 2010). The number of municipalities also makes
cooperative behavior more difficult because the increasing complexity of relationships
between local governments results in making cooperation problematic. In this sense,
competitive behavior of local governments is an inevitable result when we consider the
given circumstances.
Competitive behavior does not necessarily always produce negative results. There
is an argument that competition can conversely lead to positive results. Specifically,
according to the public choice theory, competition has a positive impact on
organizational performance (Boyne, 1996). This competitive ethos compels local
governments to “do the right things and do things right” (Boyne, 1996, p.704). To the
contrary, many previous studies indicate that there is a possibility that incentive
competition can result in threatening the local economy (Ellis & Rogers, 2000; Patrick,
2014). Additionally, this intense competition for business incentives results in a low
quality of public service because business incentives can only relocate the business across
municipalities and not lead to the real change of economic growth (Bartik, 1991; Fisher
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& Peters, 1997; Wang, 2016). If we assume the extreme case, previous studies raise the
possibility of border wars (Wang, 2018). Although there is a theoretical argument that
supports the positive effect of competitive behavior of local governments, the destructive
aspect of competition among municipalities is generally more persuasive in this field.
Many previous studies have analyzed the relationship between competition and
business incentives and, usually, have found a positive relationship between incentives
and competition. Zheng and Warner (2010) found that a government is more likely to use
incentives if it faces intergovernmental competition. According to a study by Felix and
Hines (2013), a government that is located close to a state border line is more likely to
adopt a program of business incentives and competition. Green and Fleischmann (1991)
found that a municipality is more likely to follow other municipalities’ choice of the
business incentive if the other municipalities are located in the same Census Region.
Bowman (1988) also found that cities tend to have a competitive ethos and this attitude
results in aggressive economic development programs. In general, previous studies
support the idea of a positive relationship between economic development incentives and
horizontal competition.
Despite these previous studies, little direct evidence exists as to the extent to
which competition influences local government’s decision regarding economic
development priorities and affects the probability of extensively adopting the use of
business incentives in a municipality. Unfortunately, previous studies do not clearly
answer this question. For example, Bowman (1988) focuses only on southeastern cities,
making it difficult to generalize the result. When Zheng and Warner (2010) estimate the
extent of the use of business incentives and the degree of competition, they simply count
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the average number of business incentives used and address the issue of competition
among six questionnaire categories. In other words, we cannot know exactly the extent to
which competition influences local government’s decision regarding economic
development priorities and the impact it has on the extensive use of business incentives.
Green and Fleischmann (1991) also use a similar method when they estimate the level of
competitiveness. In their study, they used the average number of business incentives of a
number of local governments when they estimated regional competition. Felix and Hines
(2013) analyze the factors of tax credits, tax abatement, and TIF, but they focus only on
the probability of adoption, not the extensive use of business incentives.
To address these limitations, this paper used a new survey to estimate the extent
to which competition influences local government’s decision-making regarding economic
development priorities. By changing the survey method of ICMA, we were able to obtain
more exact data about the extent to which competition influences local government’s
decision regarding economic development priorities and the extent of business incentives.
Specifically, the 2004 and 2009 ICMA surveys of economic development asked the
survey participants to simply identify a jurisdiction’s competition category and the
adoption status of business incentives. Structurally, it is not possible to obtain detailed
information about competition and business incentives. By changing the questionnaire
methodology, the 2014 ICMA survey offered an opportunity to contribute to the field of
business incentives.
By following and expanding the logic of previous studies, we can easily conclude
that a positive relationship likely exists between the extent to which competition
influences local government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and
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the extensive use of incentives. In line with previous studies, we propose the following
two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: As the extent to which competition affects the decision of
municipalities regarding economic development priorities gets stronger, the
probability of adopting business incentives is likely to be increased.
Hypothesis 2: As the extent to which competition affects the decision of
municipalities regarding economic development priorities gets stronger, the
extent of business incentives is likely to be increased.
3.2.2

Theoretical Perspective of the Use of an Economic Development Policy

Generally, there are two meaningful features that affect the use of business
incentives in the community. The first character is the degree of proximity of other states
(Felix & Hines, 2013). If a community is close to other states, this fact may increase the
level of competitiveness of the environment. As a result, the community is more likely to
adopt or use business incentives. The second feature is related to the political culture.
Troubled political cultures lead to the greater likelihood that business incentives will be
offered (Felix & Hines, 2013). In this paper, the concept of a troubled culture is estimated
by the corruption rate of a state. Apart from these general explanations, there are several
perspectives that theoretically explain the adoption and use of economic development
policies.
The political rationality model explains that economic development initiatives
offer local political actors an opportunity to appeal to their constituent groups
(Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001; Sharp, 1991; Wolman & Spitzley, 1996). This distinctive
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feature of business incentives enables elected officials to strengthen their policy support
by using the visible function of business incentives as a reward for political support. For
example, the popularity of a mayor and elected officials is closely related to their
administration’s economic development policy (Bowman, 1988). By slightly expanding
the findings of previous studies, we anticipate that the structure and form of government
has a relationship with the extensive use of business incentives. The previous studies
already show the possibility of a close relationship between government structure and
incentives. Several studies have found that the form of government has an impact on
innovative practices, citizen participation, and economic development policies (Nelson &
Svara, 2012; Sharp, 1991; Yang & Callahan, 2011). If we fully understand the
differences between typical government structures, such as the mayor-council and
council-manager systems, we can infer the relationship. Basically, the mayor-council
system is evaluated as being a more responsive system than the manager-council system
because the mayor-council system is based on short-term electoral incentives (Lyons,
1978). Although this incentive could lead to positive outcomes, such as organizational
innovation (Williamson, 1988), the mayor-council system can lead to the reckless pursuit
of visible programs that usually increase the financial burden. On the other hand, because
managers in the council-manager system pursue long-term strategies and professional
goals, the council-manager system has institutional strategies and devices to preclude
political opportunism. When choosing a manager, the degree of the manager candidate’s
professionalism is a key criterion. Such professionalism is evaluated by the experience,
education, and membership of professional associations (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). In this
sense, it is reasonable to assume that the council-manager system tends to use business
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incentives less compared to the mayor-council system. Other researchers indirectly
support this idea that the council-manager system results in less local spending and
taxation (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). On this basis, the next
hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 3: The council-manager system is negatively associated with the
adoption of business incentives.
Hypothesis 4: The council-manager system is negatively associated with the
extent of use of business incentives.

There has been a continuous debate over which theory has more explanatory
power in terms of business incentives. The representative debate is that of structure
versus agency, and this dispute has led to several case studies (Kantor, 1988; Wong,
1988). The basic logic of structural theory is that economic and social conditions
determine a city’s economic development policies. This theory has something in common
with the City Limits theory of Peterson (1981). According to Peterson’s theory, local
government is similar to private firms because municipalities compete against each other
to enhance their economic position and social prestige (Fleischmann et al., 1992). This
competition forces public officials to pay close attention to social and economic
indicators, such as unemployment and poverty rates. Local public officials naturally feel
pressure to do something to attract new investment to maintain or improve the current
economic position (Fleischmann et al., 1992). In other words, structural theory claims
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that a city’s social and economic conditions are factors influencing the use of business
incentives.
On the contrary, human agency theory argues that specific actors are the key
factors affecting local development policy. This theory naturally links to the growth
machine theory. This theory explains that local elite groups, which include politicians,
the media, and companies, have driven the city’s economic growth. Thus, human agency
theory concludes that a changing political leadership and coalition building play an
important role in shaping economic development policies because they usually put a high
value on economic growth through development policies.
Strategic interaction with other local governments is also associated with the
adoption and extensive use of business incentives. For example, if a local government
adopts a TIF program, this has an impact on the decisions of other local governments.
Byrne (2005) found that strategic interaction acts as an important mechanism when
municipalities adopt TIF programs. Business incentives are intended to operate as
competitive levers. A certain degree of fiscal policy interdependence has been identified
by previous studies as explaining mutual interaction among municipalities (Brueckner,
2003; Revelli, 2005). Specifically, municipalities are reluctant to independently select a
fiscal policy and check the choices of other, neighboring governments. Case, Rosen, and
Hines (1993) found that per capita expenditure of state government is statistically
positively associated with neighboring state governments. This fiscal policy interaction is
also influenced by the yardstick of political competition. Municipal residents, who
usually have imperfect information about other governments, tend to impose political
pressure on their local leaders to ask the government to follow or imitate the policy status
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of neighboring governments. This mechanism is supported by previous studies (Besley &
Case, 1995; Ermini & Santolini, 2007; Ollé, 2003), which offer an abundance of
theoretical explanations for the adoption and use of economic development policies.
3.2.3

Practical Perspective on the Use of Economic Development Policies

Many previous studies that have analyzed economic development policy have
also been conducted according to a practical social index to explain the mechanisms
involved. A well-known argument addresses the effect a city’s wealth condition has on
the use of business incentives. According to a few studies, business incentives are more
likely to be used if a city is prospering (Reese, 1991; Rubin, 1988). These conclusions
have attracted a lot of counterarguments. Conversely, a city under severe fiscal stress is
more likely to offer business development incentives (Feiock & Clingermayer, 1992;
Felix & Hines, 2013). For example, the unemployment rate is used as a proxy for the
fiscal stress of a municipality. A higher unemployment rate is positively associated with
an incentive package (Fisher & Peters, 1997). Wang (2018) found that a rising
unemployment rate leads to increasing economic development incentive spending. Man
(1999) found that there is more adoption of TIF if a community has a lower income level,
while a higher personal income is negatively related with spending on economic
development incentives (Wang, 2018). The manufacturing share of employment is also
used as an indicator of economic distress. Fleischmann et al. (1992) found no significant
relationship between the percentage of jobs in manufacturing and economic development
policies. Wang (2018) found the same result about the manufacturing share of
employment. Overall, the literature supports the idea that conditions of economic distress
lead to more adoption and use of economic development incentives.
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A municipality’s demographic characteristics have an impact on economic
development incentives. One such representative indicator is population size and city
size. For instance, larger cities are more likely to offer businesses incentive programs
because they tend to have more resources and be under greater pressure (Cook & Beck
1991; Friedman, 1990). This trend is also confirmed by recent studies. Felix and Hines
(2013) found that a greater population is significantly associated with offering tax
incentives. More detailed demographic information is also used in studies. Rork (2003)
argues that the size of the elderly population could affect the economic development
incentives because elderly people are more active voters than young people.
Additionally, several general complementary reasons explain why local
governments actively engage in business incentive programs (Wolman & Spitzley, 1996).
First, the increased mobility of capital contributes to increasing the competition among
governments at the same level and expanding the use of business incentives (Clarke &
Gaile, 1989). Second, slow economic growth could have an influence on business
incentive policy because a declining economic situation results in more pressure to do
something for residents with economic difficulties (Wolman & Spitzley, 1996). This
pattern is also confirmed by the recent economic recession. Warner and Zheng (2013)
found that local governments tend to respond to recession through the use of business
incentives. Third, economic restructuring could lead to increasing the number of
economic development programs. For example, if a municipality has a higher level of
manufacturing employment, the municipality is more likely to adopt a development
program. Lastly, Clarke and Gaile (1989) point out that decreasing federal government
assistance may be one reason for increasing business programs. Although many
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explanations exist for explaining the use of business incentives, only a few studies have
analyzed the impact that economic and social factors have on the extensive use of
business incentives.

3.3

Data

This study is based on the 2014 survey of municipality economic development
trends conducted by ICMA. This survey was sent to 5,237 county and city-type
governments in June 2014. Among local governments, 1,201 participated in this survey
and the response rate was 23%. Like previous surveys, chief municipal administrative
officers responded to this one. The ICMA survey estimated a variety of business
incentives—16 components in all. For example, zoning assistance, utility reductions, and
regulatory flexibility are included in this category. The average number of business
incentives used is approximately eight. This paper limits the scope of subject to tax
credits and TIF because these two business incentives are widely accepted, and research
has been actively conducted on these two topics. The changed style of questionnaire
allowed us to estimate the extent of the use of tax credits and TIF. This is one of the main
differences with previous studies.
To analyze which factors determine or motivate the adoption of business
incentives and the extent of the use of business incentives, this study includes motivated
economic development priorities. This category includes competition and political
leadership. Due to the new style survey, this study can measure the extent to which
competition has an impact on the decision-making of municipalities regarding economic
development priorities. This survey also asked municipalities the number of barriers that
impede the use of business incentives among municipalities. The average level of
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economic development barriers is calculated by the average level of a total of 21 barriers.
The scale of barriers is coded as follows: 1 = “None,” 2 = “Low,” 3 = “Medium,” and 4 =
“High.” As shown in descriptive table 3.1, the average level of barriers is about 2.19,
which is between low and medium level. Additionally, the form of government and
barriers faced is also added as a factor of business incentives. To address the issue of
endogeneity, lagged social and economic condition variables were derived from 5-year
estimates of the 2011 American Community Survey. Lastly, the paper used the 2012
Government Finance Database (Pierson, Hand, & Thompson, 2015) for local government
financial data. Although the survey sample starts from 1200 municipalities, this study
was able to use approximately 700 municipalities in the final dataset after matching
socioeconomic and financial data: general fund balance, per capita general total revenue,
and total outstanding debt.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Tax credit1 (Binary)

.54

.5

0

1

Tax credit2 (Ordered)

1.87

.97

1

4

TIF (Binary)

.62

.49

0

1

TIF (Ordered)

2.26

1.17

1

4

Total number of business incentives (of 16)

8.44

3.66

0

16

Increased competition

2.81

.92

1

4

Unemployment rate

8.58

3.44

1.7

29.5

Poverty rate

13.09

7.82

1.8

45.9

% of manufacturing employment

14.24

7.53

1.05

50.34

10.9

.37

9.84

12.25

Form of government

.77

.42

0

1

Change in political leadership

.76

.43

0

1

Average level of economic development
barriers
Per capita total revenue

2.19

.43

1

3.33

1.87

1.24

.25

10.86

General fund balance

1.05

.21

.48

3.28

Total debt (% of total revenues)

1.24

1.51

0

24.09

Population (log)

10.46

.89

8.07

14.2

Bachelor’s degree or higher (%)

31.02

15.63

3.1

87.9

The average level of use incentives

1.86

0.67

0

3.5

Sample size

694

Median family income (log)

Note: Tax credit1: 1 = Use, 0 = No use; Tax credit2: 1 = No use, 2 = Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = High; TIF1: 1
= Use, 0 = No use; TIF2: 1 = No use, 2 = Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = High; Increased competition: 1 = No
motivation, 2 = Minimal motivation, 3 = Moderate motivation, 4 = Significant motivation; Form of
government: 1: Council-manager, 0: Mayor-council; Change in political leadership: 1 = Motivation, 0 = No
motivation; Average level of economic development barriers: 1 = None; 2 = Low; 3 = Medium; 4 = High.

3.4

Model

One frequently asked question concerns which of the variations among
municipalities have had an influence on the adoption and extent of the use of economic
development incentives. Previous studies in the literature have made and tested diverse
hypotheses to identify and analyze the factors of business incentives. The purpose of this
study is also aimed at understanding the logic of business incentives. Specifically, this
73

paper seeks to determine whether the driving factors of incentives are different depending
on business incentive type or not and if the adoption or use of incentives by
municipalities can be differentiated from non-adopting local governments. First, logit
analysis is used to analyze the effect of explanatory variables on the utilization of tax
credit and TIF. As Wooldridge (2013) suggests, we can change the logit coefficients to
probability changes. The average partial effect is used for this analysis. Second, this study
uses the ordered probit model because the dependent variables are ordinal. Third, a
negative binominal model is used because the total number of business incentives is a
non-negative integer with a count value. Although we can use the Poisson regression
model as a count model, this study uses a negative binomial model because the Poisson
model operates under the assumption that the variable is equally dispersed (Zheng &
Warner, 2010). In this case, the total number of business incentives to be counted is
overdispersed (tendency to 0 and large values). Thus, the negative binomial model is
more appropriate than the Poisson model.
The dependent variables of this study are tax credits, TIF, and total number of
business incentives. To compare the non-adoption and adoption groups, this study creates
two dummy variables for tax credit and TIF. We then code the extent of use of tax credit
and TIF as follows: 1= “No use,” 2 = “Low,” 3 = “Medium,” and 4 = “High.” Figure 1
shows the detailed information on the use of business incentives. Lastly, we count the
total number of business incentives to estimate the extent of the use of business
incentives as another proxy. The paper measures the degree of adoption of incentives and
uses it with the following independent variables derived from previous studies. As
mentioned above, the variables listed in the literature include competition, socioeconomic
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condition, political leadership, form of government, and financial conditions. Detailed
information for each variable is presented below.

Use of Business Incentives (n = 694)
50%

46.40%

45%
38.18%

40%
35%

27.23%

30%

22.48%
18.88%

25%
18.30%

20%

21.04%

15%
7.49%

10%
5%
0%

No use

Low use

Medium use

Tax credit

High use

TIF

Figure 3.1 Tax credit and tax increment financing use, U.S. municipalities, 2014
Competition

Earlier studies have shown that local governments are facing intense competition
with other governments. We confirm that this competitive behavior has an influence on
overall economic development incentives. Structurally, municipalities cannot easily
cooperate with each other because the context of economic development contains the
characteristics of a zero-sum game. Based on this fact, this study constructed the
hypotheses in a previous section. We predict that there is more probability of the
adoption and extensive use of business incentives if the extent to which competition has
an impact on the decision-making of municipalities regarding economic development

75

priorities is stronger. The variable is coded as follows: 1 = “No motivation,” 2 =
“Minimal motivation,” 3 = “Moderate motivation,” and 4 = “Significant motivation.”
Socioeconomic and Demographic Conditions
A business incentive is usually designed with the purpose of expanding the tax
base and increasing job creation. Based on the goals described by various policies and
studies in the literature, we expect that higher rates of poverty and unemployment lead to
heavier use by local governments. Recently, the manufacturing share of employment is
recognized as an indicator of economic distress. Thus, we anticipate that there may be a
positive association between the percentage of jobs in manufacturing and business
incentives. It is also expected that median family income may be negatively associated
with business incentives. In line with the literature, a higher population may be more
likely to increase the use of business incentives. Lastly, the percentage of bachelor’s or
higher degrees is included as an additional environmental context.
3.4.1

Political Reasons and Government Structure

This study also analyzes whether changes in political leadership influence a local
government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and thus affect the
adoption and extent of business incentives. Human agency theory suggests that a specific
actor can determine the direction of business incentives. In other words, changing the
political leadership can lead to a higher use of business incentives. If a significant change
in the political leadership of a local government has more of an impact on the decisionmaking processes of municipalities regarding economic development priorities, then we
expect that there is a higher probability of the adoption and extensive use of business
incentives. Additionally, we raise the possibility that the council-manager system is likely
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to constrain the use of business incentives because the manager in the council-manager
system is likely to pursue a more long-term perspective.
3.4.2

Economic Development Barriers

We anticipate governments that have more barriers to economic development will
be less likely to adopt and use business incentives. For example, a local government
could not easily obtain momentum if the government is facing strong citizen opposition
to economic development. In this regard, a higher level of barriers to economic
development leads to the less adoption and use of business incentives. In 2014, the top
three barriers were cost of land, lack of capital/funding, and lack of buildings.
3.4.3

Fiscal Condition

We use per capital total revenue, general fund balance, and the ratio of total
outstanding debt to total revenue to control the fiscal conditions of local government. The
per capita total revenue indicates budgetary solvency (Gorina, Maher, & Joffe, 2018).
General fund balance is an indicator of cash solvency; thus, it is expected that there is a
positive relationship with the extent of use of business incentives. Debt as a share of total
revenue shows the level of the long-term solvency of local government (Gorina, Maher,
& Joffe, 2018), suggesting a negative association with the extent of use of business
incentives.
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3.5

Model Results

The first results test the effects of increased competition and the form of
government on the use of tax credit incentives and TIF. The results are presented in Table
3.2 Column 1 including only tax credits, measured by binary variables, and Column 2
including TIF as binary dependent variables. As shown in Column 1, the councilmanager system is 7.8% less likely than the mayor-council system to incentivize tax
credits. This result supports hypothesis 3. As the extent to which changes in political
leadership impacting the decision-making of municipalities regarding economic
development priorities gets stronger, the probability of tax credits being adopted is likely
to be increased. This result supports the human agency theory. As we expected, the
average level of economic development barriers has a negative impact on the
implementation of the tax credit policy. Consistent with previous studies, population size
increases the implementation of the tax credit policy. Column 2 in Table 3.2 shows that
as the extent to which competition affects the decision of municipalities regarding
economic development priorities gets stronger, the probability of adopting TIF is likely to
be increased. In contrast to the case of the tax credit system, increased competition
increases the adoption of TIF. Although unemployment, poverty rates, and median family
income decrease the adoption of TIF, the manufacturing employment rate increases the
adoption of TIF. The negative effects of poverty and unemployment rates are not
consistent with previous findings in the literature. In fact, the council-manager system is
11.1% less likely than the mayor-council system to adopt TIF. This result also supports
the hypothesis.

78

Table 3.2 Logistic regression: Effects of increased competition and the form of
government on the adoption of tax credit policies and TIF.
VARIABLES

Increased competition
Unemployment rate
Poverty rate
% of manufacturing employment
Median family income (log)
Form of government
Change in political leadership
Average level of economic development barriers
Per capita total revenue
General fund balance
Total debt(% of total revenues)
Population (log)
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%)
Observations

(1)
Tax credit
(Binary)

(2)
TIF
(Binary)

-0.006
(0.020)
-0.008
(0.007)
0.002
(0.006)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.204
(0.138)
-0.078*
(0.045)
0.095**
(0.042)
-0.110**
(0.045)
0.027*
(0.016)
-0.057
(0.091)
0.010
(0.015)
0.116***
(0.022)
-0.004*
(0.002)
694

0.037*
(0.020)
-0.015**
(0.007)
-0.009*
(0.006)
0.006**
(0.003)
-0.533***
(0.133)
-0.111**
(0.046)
0.009
(0.043)
-0.058
(0.045)
-0.014
(0.015)
-0.080
(0.090)
0.016
(0.016)
0.029
(0.022)
0.005**
(0.002)
694

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Second, the maximum likelihood estimation does not directly show the magnitude
of the effects. Thus, this study uses marginal effects for interpretation. Table 3.3 presents
the marginal effects of the variables on the extent to which tax credits are used. This table
enables us to interpret the magnitude of the impact of both increased competition and the
form of government, holding other variables at mean values. For example, a local
government experienced a 10% increase in the probability of not using tax credits,
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whereas it experienced a 3% decrease in the probability of high use of tax credits as the
governments converted their forms from mayor-council to council-manager, with other
variables being held at their mean values. Increased competition does not have a
statistically significant association with the extent of use of tax credits. A local
government with a population that is 1% above average has 11% decreased probability of
choosing “No Use,” and 5% and 3% increased probability of choosing “Medium Use”
and “High Use,” respectively. Additionally, as the extent to which a change in the
political leadership of a local government has an impact on the decision-making of
municipalities regarding economic development priorities, a municipality experiences a
7% decrease in the probability of choosing “No Use,” but it experiences a 3% increase in
the probability of choosing “Medium Use”.

Table 3.3 Marginal effects of variables on the extent of use of tax credit
VARIABLES

No Use

Low Use

Medium
Use

High Use

Increased competition
Unemployment rate
Poverty rate
% of manufacturing employment
Median family income(log)
Form of government
Change in political leadership
Average level of economic
development barriers
Per capita total revenue
General fund balance
Total debt(% of total revenues)
Population (log)
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%)

-0.02
0.01
0.00
-0.00
0.34**
0.10**
-0.07*
0.09**

0.01
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.07**
-0.02**
0.01
-0.02**

0.01
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.17**
-0.05**
0.03*
-0.05**

0.01
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.10**
-0.03**
0.02
-0.03**

-0.03*
0.06
-0.00
-0.11***
0.00*

0.01*
-0.01
0.00
0.02***
-0.00

0.01*
-0.03
0.00
0.05***
-0.00*

0.01*
-0.02
0.00
0.03***
-0.00*

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Rows might not add up to 0 owing to rounding.
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Table 3.4 presents the marginal effects of variables on the extent of use of TIF.
Unlike the case with tax credits, as the level of competition increases by one level, the
probability of choosing “No Use” decreases by 5%, while the probability of choosing
“Medium Use” and “High Use” increases by 1% and 3%, respectively. Table 3.4 also
shows the marginal effects of other variables while holding other variables at mean
values. Specifically, a municipality with an unemployment rate 1% above the average
unemployment rate has 2% increased probability of choosing “No Use,” and a 1%
decrease in probability of choosing “Medium Use” as well as a 1% decrease for “High
Use.” This result is different from those of previous studies. More specifically, previous
studies suggest that economic distress leads to more extensive use of economic
development incentives. This study also found that a municipality experiences a 13%
decrease in the probability of choosing “No Use” if the government is mayor-council as
opposed to council manager with a 9% increase in the probability of choosing “High
Use.” This result supports the general idea of the effect of government structure.
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Table 3.4 Marginal effects of variables on the extent of use of TIF
VARIABLES

No Use

Low Use

Medium Use

High Use

Increased competition
Unemployment rate
Poverty rate
% of manufacturing employment
Median family income(log)
Form of government
Change in political leadership
Average level of economic
development barriers
Per capita total revenue
General fund balance
Total debt(% of total revenues)
Population (log)
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%)

-0.05**
0.02***
0.01*
0.01*
0.50***
0.13***
0.01
0.08**

-0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.01**
-0.01**
-0.00*
0.00**
-0.15***
-0.04***
-0.00
-0.03**

0.03**
-0.01***
-0.01*
0.00**
-0.37***
-0.09***
-0.00
-0.06**

0.01
0.11
-0.00
-0.03
0.00*

0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00

-0.00
-0.04
0.00
0.01
0.00*

-0.01
-0.08
0.00
0.02
0.00*

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Rows might not add up to 0.0 owing to rounding.

Table 3.5 shows the predicted marginal values converted from the negative
binomial regression model for the total number of business incentives in a municipality.
As shown in Table 3.5, as increased competition is boosted by one level, the total number
of business incentives increases by 0.53 while controlling for all other variables. As the
share of manufacturing employment increases by 1%, the total number of business
incentives increases by 0.06. This study found that the form of government does not have
an association with the total number of business incentives. In fact, it is actually per
capita total revenue and population size that have a positive impact on the total number of
business incentives.
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Table 3.5 Model result (Predicted Marginal Values) for total number of business
incentives
Total number of business
incentives
VARIABLES
Increased competition
0.53***
(0.14)
Unemployment rate
-0.04
(0.05)
Poverty rate
-0.02
(0.04)
% of manufacturing employment
0.06***
(0.02)
Median family income(log)
-4.23***
(1.03)
Form of government
0.06
(0.32)
Change in political leadership
0.43
(0.30)
Average level of economic development barriers
0.34
(0.31)
Per capita total revenue
0.20**
(0.10)
General fund balance
-1.42*
(0.75)
Total debt(% of total revenues)
0.12
(0.09)
Population (log)
0.96***
(0.14)
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%)
-0.01
(0.01)
Note. Marginal value derived from the negative binomial model. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Lastly, this study used the average level of business incentive use because the
total number of business incentives is just an arithmetic quantity and fails to express the
degree of use of business incentives. To obtain the average level of business incentive
use, the average of a total of 16 incentives was calculated. For example, enterprise zones,
training support, and one-stop permit issuance were included. The scale of the barriers
was coded as follows: 1 = “No use,” 2 = “Low,” 3 = “Medium,” and 4 = “High.” The
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average level of business incentive use was about 1.85, which is between the low and
medium levels. Table 3.6 shows that increased competition has a statistically significant
impact on the overall average level of business incentive use. This result supports the
findings of previous studies on the effect of competition among local governments.
Additionally, the percentage of manufacturing employment and population had a positive
impact on the average level of business incentive use. This result also supports the
findings of previous studies. However, other variables, such as the form of government
and changes in political leadership, did not have a statistically significant impact on the
average level of business incentive use.
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Table 3.6 Model result for the average level of business incentive uses
The average level of use
of business incentives
0.08***
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01***
(0.00)
-0.36*
(0.19)
0.01
(0.06)
0.03
(0.06)
-0.08
(0.06)
0.02
(0.10)
-0.12
(0.10)
0.01
(0.02)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)

VARIABLES
Increased competition
Unemployment rate
Poverty rate
% of manufacturing employment
Median family income(log)
Form of government
Change in political leadership
Average level of economic development barriers
Per capita total revenue
General fund balance
Total debt(% of total revenues)
Population (log)
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.6

Conclusion

This study has analyzed a unique data set that enables us to estimate the degree to
which a local government’s features influence the adoption and use of business
incentives. This study focuses on determining what factors differentiate the
municipalities that promote business incentives from those that do not. This study found
that as the extent to which competition affecting the decision of municipalities regarding
economic development priorities gets stronger, the probability of introducing TIF is
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likely to increase. However, increased competition does not have a statistically
significant association with the implementation of tax credit policies. This could be
evidence that the competition mechanism is inconsistently influencing the
implementation of economic development policy. Human agency theory is partially
supported by these findings because a change in political leadership has only a
statistically positive impact on the introduction of tax credit incentives. Furthermore, the
effect of the form of government on the implementation of business incentives shows
consistent results. Those in a council-manager system are less likely than those in a
mayor-council system to utilize tax credit incentives and TIF. This result supports the
idea that the council-manager system constrains short-term interest that favors economic
development policies (Feiock et al., 2003).
The distinctive data enables us to analyze the marginal effect of variables on the
extent of use of business incentives. This study found that the effect of increased
competition could be different depending on the type of incentive. Specifically, as the
extent to which competition affects the decision of municipalities regarding economic
development priorities gets stronger, the utilization of TIF is likely to increase. However,
this competition mechanism shows different results in terms of the use of tax credit
incentives. As expected, the average level of economic barriers has a negative impact on
the extent of use of business incentives. This study could not provide clear evidence of
the effects of economic distress on the extent to which business incentives are used.
If we limit the scope of the dependent variable to account for the total number of
business incentives, the results are different. The form of government does not have a
statistically significant effect on the total number of business incentives. As the extent to
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which competition affects the decision of municipalities regarding economic
development priorities increases by one level, the total number of business incentive uses
increases. This means that the competition mechanism has a positive association with the
total number of business incentives that are used.
To sum up the main findings, this study suggests that the effects of the
competition mechanism could be different depending on the type of incentive that is
considered. The council-manager system constrains the overall adoption and extent of use
of economic development policies. Only few studies have been conducted on the
adoption and extent of use of incentives; likewise, very few have analyzed the effects of
the form of government on business incentives. Using unique data on economic
development policies, this study could contribute to the development of a more nuanced
logic of business incentives use among local governments.
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CHAPTER 4. WHY DO STATE GOVERNMENTS OFTEN USE TAX-BASED INCENTIVES?

Abstract
To determine why local governments often use tax-based incentives, this study focuses
on five major tax-based incentives: job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, R&D
credits, property tax abatements, and customized job training subsidies. The statistical
results indicate that a state government’s prevailing political ideology influences the
choice of economic development activities. Accordingly, a more liberal state may be
more likely to discourage property tax abatements and customized job-training subsidies
and encourage job creation tax credits. Additionally, the competition mechanism does not
operate as a trigger for tax-based incentives. This study also finds that state economic
conditions are inversely related to the use of incentives. This result could imply the
prevalence of political factors in the use of incentives.
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4.1

An Initial Statement of the Policy Issue of Interest

Many state and local governments in the United States offer incentives to attract
businesses to their cities. For instance, Amazon's search for a location for its second
headquarters recently created a bidding war worth millions or even billions of dollars.
Wisconsin promised to provide $3 billion in incentives to Foxconn in exchange for a TV
factory, and New Jersey offered $5 billion to entice Amazon (Porter, 2018). These types
of incentives have a long history, but competition seems to be heating up among state and
local governments. The number of state business-incentive programs has more than
doubled from less than 1,000 in 1999 to nearly 2,000 in 2015 (Council for Community
and Economic Research (CCER), 2015). Thomas (2000) estimated conservatively that
total state and local expenditures on economic-development incentives totaled around
$48.8 billion in 1996, and Peters and Fisher (2004) similarly estimated them at around
$50 billion. While facing high unemployment rates and dwindling state tax revenue
during the recovery from the Great Recession, local governments increasingly have been
engaging in economic-development policy to boost their economies. To achieve their
objectives, policy makers, for example, may designate industrial parks or invest in
infrastructure, among many potential policy alternatives.
Although a vast body of literature on tax-incentive policies already exists, these
studies do not provide clear answers about the efficacy of policy (Bartik, 1991; Goetz et
al., 2011; Patrick, 2014). This raises the question of why state and local governments
actively use tax-based incentives despite a lack of supporting evidence. Although recent
studies have analyzed the factors tied to local tax-based policy at the city and county
levels (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Dewees, Lobao, & Swanson, 2003; Lewis, 2002; Lobao
& Kraybill, 2005; Reese, 2006), few studies have analyzed tax-based incentives at the
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state level, at which the available data is limited, even though the influence of state
governments continues to increase and many tax-based incentives have been provided by
state governments for a long time (Carlton, 1983). The role of state governments has
become crucial because the discretion and responsibility for many federal public
programs has shifted to state governments, starting with the Reagan administration
(Heinrich, 2002). Economic development policy has followed the same pattern, and, in
this sense, more state-level studies are needed.
The determinants of previous studies have mainly included socioeconomics,
fiscal forces, and demographic factors (Reese, 2006). In other words, there has been little
attention paid to political factors on the use of tax-based incentives. To bridge the
literature gap, this study focuses on the state level and uses comprehensive tax-based
data. The paper expands the scope of the subjects of study to include 32 states and five
widely used tax-based incentives. The characteristics of the study could differentiate
between previous studies that only focused on specific areas and single incentives. In
addition, this study includes government ideology to analyze the effects of politics on
economic development policies. Accordingly, this paper aims to contribute to the field of
tax-based incentives by positing the following research questions: (1) What are the
primary factors that increase the use of tax-based incentives by state governments? (2)
What is the impact of the socioeconomic factors, government capacity, politics,
neighboring states and industrial composition of states on the use of tax incentives?
The results suggest that the use of tax-based incentives varies by the type of
incentive. Generally, the strength of liberalism in a state plays an important role in the
overall use of incentives. This result could partially explain why state governments use
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incentives despite the lack of supporting evidence. Economically poor state governments
tend to resist offering customized job training subsidies but are likely to increase the use
of investment tax credits. The neighbor effect does not operate as a trigger for the use of
tax-based incentives. The percentage of manufacturing employment has a negative
impact on the use of two incentives, which is somewhat surprising given the condition of
manufacturing industry.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The first section comprises a
brief explanation of tax incentives and reviews the literature concerning the determinants
of economic-incentive policy decisions, as well as the foremost theories. The subsequent
section describes the data and methods, and the study concludes with the results and a
discussion of noteworthy findings.

4.2
4.2.1

Literature Review

Determinants of Tax-Based Incentives

As many governmental functions, including economic-growth initiatives, have
been decentralized to local governments since the 1980s, local governments have been at
the forefront of crafting major local economic-development policy that aims to meet the
locality’s needs and improve its economic status (Lobao & Kraybill, 2005). Therefore,
the primary interest of the literature centers around the efficacy of financial incentive
programs. However, literature exists that has investigated whether a broad range of
demographic, economic, geographical, industrial, and political factors affects the
motivation of local governments concerning financial-incentive programs (Basolo &
Huang, 2001; Sullivan, 2002; Dewees et al., 2003; Fleischmann, Green, & Kwong, 1991;
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Goetz et al., 2011; Lobao & Kraybill, 2009; Laura A. Reese, 2006; Scott L. Minkoff,
2009). Scholars have examined variations in the conditions under which local
governments are willing or able to adopt different policies, although their views diverge
in explaining the variation, with some citing economic and political structure and others
citing actions tied to local political and economic actors (Fleischmann et al., 1991). The
structural explanation assumes that social and economic factors – including the location
and size of a community, median household income, poverty, and other factors – make it
difficult for public officials to determine whether to adopt economic-incentive policies.
On the other hand, literature that emphasizes the actions of local political and economic
actors points toward the importance of leadership, coalition building, organization,
political influence, and similar elements in the local policy process (Fleischmann et al.,
1991). As many studies suggest, a broad range of economic and political factors also
influences a state’s motivations for turning to financial-incentive programs. Also, the
Council for Community and Economic Research (CCER, 2015) documents that states
launch more business-incentive programs in response to national recessions and after
major state elections, especially those involving big political shifts. A substantial portion
of recent incentive programs created over the past few years has included capital-access
programs, mainly due to the inception of the State Small Business Credit Initiative of the
U.S. Treasury Department. Following the Great Recession of 2007-09 and the state
elections of 2010, which brought 27 new governors to power, states enacted almost 100
new incentive programs in 2011 (CCER, 2015).
Socioeconomic Factors
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According to Peterson (1981), ‘city limit theory’ emphasizes economic principles
that make communities compete with each other to retain or attract investment and
capital (Deslatte, 2015). Local governments seek to promote their own interests, such as
making their communities robust and healthy or increasing tax revenue. This economicsbased theory is built on the belief that decisions of cities are made using principles
designed to raise public utility and the desire to achieve a strong economic position
among competing localities. However, such interest-seeking behavior is limited by a
concern that people and businesses may move out of their communities if a tax rate is too
high or the quality of public services is low compared with adjacent or competing
neighborhoods. The competition effect and the pressure of constituents may force policy
makers to offer economic incentives excessively, leading, in turn, to an economic arms
race. In this sense, this theory explains why a tax-based policy is popular and often is
overused. To put it simply, local officials have little knowledge of the authentic needs
and desires of the residents or businesses that they wish to attract. Because of this
uncertainty, localities tend to provide more economic incentives than necessary to hold or
attract businesses (Betz et al., 2012).
City-limit theory suggests that local governments are more likely to engage in
economic-incentive programs if the share of the poor population is high, medianhousehold income is low, or the quality of public services is low. One argument contends
that areas with extreme poverty tend to favor economic-development policy because of
the burden of redistributive programs or the pressure of constituents (Peterson, 1981).
Rubin and Rubin (1987) examine the practice of Illinois cities of offering cash subsidies,
revenue bonds, water-rate reductions, or infrastructure to attract and retain business
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activity. This study reports that cities with low income residents and high unemployment
are more likely than affluent cities to offer infrastructure improvements, tax abatements,
and tax-increment financing (TIF). A study by Felix and Hines (2013) provides
supporting evidence that the probability of offering economic-incentive programs falls by
3.2 percent when median household income rises by 10 percent. This study also shows
that if communities contain a larger share of households with median incomes below
$25,000, they are more likely to offer incentives.
However, growing evidence in the literature indicates that disadvantaged
communities are less likely to adopt economic-incentive programs, suggesting that
economically challenged local governments may find it difficult to invest resources in
economic-development strategies. Dewees et al. (2003) studied the extent to which
county governments have undertaken local economic-development initiatives to improve
community well-being. The main conclusions show that rural counties are less likely than
urban counties to engage in economic-development activities, a difference that is
attributable to socioeconomic characteristics such as poverty and education. However, a
multivariate analysis suggests that the use of financial incentives is better predicted by
education and poverty levels than by geography. Once these variables are controlled, the
rural effect diminishes or disappears. The findings indicate that high poverty and less
education are associated with less use of economic-development tools, suggesting that
more-affluent localities use economic-development incentives to a greater degree than
less-affluent localities, enabling the rich to get richer (Reese, 2006).
Another factor that can influence choices concerning economic-incentive policy is
city size. A large city is more likely to offer financial-incentive-based programs than a
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small city because of a broad range of resources and pressures that are limited in small
cities (Sullivan, 2002; Fleischmann et al., 1991). Felix and Hines (2013) estimate that 10
percent population growth increases the likelihood of offering tax incentives by 0.8
percent. Lobao and Kraybill (2005) found that metro governments are more likely than
nonmetro governments to implement economic-development programs, noting the
superior position of metro governments in population attributes, local economic
conditions, and government capacity and resources. Also, they found that metro areas and
adjacent counties use financial incentives to retain or expand business activities, while
remote counties use them to attract new businesses and develop small-business activities.
Furthermore, recent literature findings go against the city-limit theory, suggesting that the
likelihood of offering tax incentives is higher for large localities than for small ones.
Although previous studies have used similar factors or determinants, the results have
been mixed.
4.2.1.1 Government Capacity
Gargan defines government capacity as “ the ability of a local government to do
what it wants to do” (Gargan, 1981, p. 656). Many previous studies have defined it
similarly (Swann, 2017; Wang et al., 2018). Generally, existing research shows that a
local administration’s capacity also affects economic-development policy. Local
governments with bigger staffs and more expertise or experience tend to adopt such a
policy, particularly when the government has a specialized department in charge of local
economic development (Sullivan, 2002; Fleischmann et al., 1991; Lobao & Kraybill,
2009). These specialized units may be another aspect of the race to the bottom because of
the pressure that bureaucrats feel to do something. As discussed in a study by
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Fleischmann et al. (1992), a positive association exists between government capacity and
number of economic-incentive programs. However, resistance to this argument has
surfaced. For instance, York, Feiock, and Steinacker (2013) suggest that bureaucratic
capacity is not a predictive factor, one reason being that local governments with
specialized administrative units may be more analytical in designing economicdevelopment policy, enabling careful reviews of evidence of the efficacy of programs,
thereby leading to less-frequent adoption.
Political Factors
Logan and Molotch (1987) criticized Peterson’s city-limit theory and developed a
growth-machine theory that emphasizes political factors, rather than economic ones, as
principal determinants of decisions of localities on economic-development policy (Logan
& Molotch, 1987). They explain the mechanism of local economic development through
the actions of business and political interests. Those who actively participate in local
issues have the most to gain or lose. Policy actors such as politicians, local media,
retailers, utility companies – all of whom benefit from community growth – act together
to increase property values (Molotch, 1976). However, those who do not benefit from
such growth might not have enough political power to exert influence, so their interests
tend to be ignored in the decision-making process. Furthermore, local political ideology
impacts economic-development policy choices. Specifically, local governments led by
Republicans are more likely to offer more incentives (Betz et al., 2012).
Regarding political factors, Felix and Hines (2013) suggest an interesting
argument that localities with troubled political cultures are more likely to adopt economic
incentives. They investigated the relationship between corruption and the number of
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selected programs, and found that the likelihood of favoring economic-incentive
programs rather than other types of economic-development policy (e.g., investment in
infrastructure) increases by 5.9 percent when government officials are convicted of
federal corruption crimes at a rate higher by 1 per 100,000 residents over the past 13
years. This suggests that some government officials may adopt economic-incentive
programs in return for money, political support, or other forms of payouts. In turn, it may
cause a dysfunctional tax system, making it more difficult for the locality to compete for
businesses without economic-incentive programs. Localities in states with high rates of
public-corruption convictions are more likely than others to offer incentives.
4.2.1.2 Industry Factors
Many local governments compete with other nearby governments to hold their
own position or to attract new businesses. Adoption of tax-based incentives is one form
of such competition. However, not all communities have the same strong desire to
implement economic-development policies because each community has different
industrial structures and demographics (Felix & Hines, 2013). This difference leads to a
diverse trade-off among economic development policies. Differences in willingness to
offer incentives may reflect the composition of industries and firms that are potential
beneficiaries (Byrnes, Marvel, & Sridhar, 1999). Communities with a large
manufacturing base are more likely to provide business tax incentives. A 10 percent
greater fraction of the workforce in manufacturing is associated with an 8.4 percent
greater probability of offering tax incentives (Felix & Hines, 2013). Other studies also
found a positive association between substantial manufacturing employment and more
active use of tax-based incentives (Reese, 2006; Wang, 2018).
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4.2.1.3 Neighbor Effect
Generally, we assume that state and local governments do not make independent
economic development policy decisions. Rather, most governments consider and review
the choices of other governments when they make fiscal decisions. Previous studies also
support this propensity of local governments (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). This
situation is called policy interdependence and strategic interaction (Wang, 2018). More
specifically, previous studies have mainly focused on the adoption of policies due to the
neighbor effect. McHone (1987) indicated that local governments tend to mimic the fiscal
decisions of neighboring communities. Man (1999) also found that a jurisdiction is more
likely to adopt TIF if a neighboring jurisdiction did so. Byrne (2005) reported similar
results, where a community is more likely to offer more TIF if a neighboring community
did the same. Based on these studies, we can conclude that local governments may affect
each other’s fiscal policies.
4.2.2

Hypotheses

The literature does not offer a consistent estimate of the efficacy of fiscal policy
(Bartik, 1991; Goetz et al., 2011) and fails to provide a clear direction on which policies
best promote growth and economic well-being. As discussed briefly above, tax incentives
account for a negligible portion of business costs, so they rarely determine business
decisions. As Peters and Fisher (2004) show, almost 90% of firms that received
incentives said they would have approved investments or hires even without them. Also,
it is difficult to keep benefits from spreading to other localities, even in cases in which
tax incentives make an impact, considering the interconnected nature of the U.S.
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economy (Davis, 2013). The evidence demonstrates that tax incentives are of little benefit
to states or localities, and are a drag on economic development.
Nonetheless, states and local governments have used tax incentives significantly,
and the best available estimates suggest that states and localities are devoting almost $50
billion to them annually (Davis, 2013). Why, then, do local governments often use taxbased incentives? The literature suggests key determinants.
First, socioeconomic characteristics, particularly income, can explain variations in
the use of tax incentives across localities, which may be more likely to offer tax-based
incentives if they have a large population of low-income residents. It is not difficult to
understand why poor communities use tax-based incentives in an effort to boost business
activities. A typical poor community, on average, lacks infrastructure and highly skilled
labor, making investments in such communities less attractive. From this perspective, a
tax-based incentive aims to offset a less attractive community environment by lowering
costs for businesses to invest. Recent literature, on the other hand, provides opposing
evidence that economically challenged localities are less likely to adopt economicincentive programs due to limited resources. Although growing evidence supports a
positive relationship between local economic conditions and tax-based incentives, the
literature suggests that consensus among researchers has not been reached. On this basis,
the first hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 1: If a state has a large share of low-income residents (based on poverty rate
and a percentage of residents on public assistance), the state will be more likely to adopt
tax-based incentives (socioeconomic factor).
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Basically, economic-development policies of local governments are based on
fiscal and economic conditions (Fisher & Peters, 1998). The concept of economic and
fiscal status is reasonably measured by the unemployment rate (Feiock, & Clingermayer,
1992; Reese, 1991). Rubin and Rubin (1987) also conceptualize this economic status as
citizen need. Specifically, a high unemployment rate indicates a high demand for local
economic-development policies. Thus, the city is more likely to try to help residents
through tax-based incentives. Higher unemployment rates are positively associated with
the use of economic-development programs (Betz et al., 2012; Lobao & Kraybill, 2005).
In line with these previous studies, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 2: If a state has a high unemployment rate, it will be more likely to adopt taxbased incentives (socioeconomic factor).
Evidence indicates that communities suffering from political unrest provide
general tax relief to avoid at least some potential criticism within the communities
experiencing economic downturns. In troubled political cultures, offering incentives may
be easier than tailoring new programs or renewing existing ones through negotiations.
Also, the number of adopted programs may be related to corruption in some cases (Felix
& Hines, 2013). This suggests that some government officials may choose economicincentive programs in return for money, political support, or other forms of payout. There
is scant literature that examined whether tax-incentive policy adoption is related to
political elections or corruption. That suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: If a state has more corruption, the state will be more likely to adopt taxbased incentives (political factor).
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Political ideology as it relates to tax-based incentives has been analyzed to a
lesser extent compared with socioeconomic factors, but political factors are highly likely
to impact local tax-based incentives. For instance, Republicans are more likely to favor
helping businesses, but they tend to be reluctant to pick winners (Betz et al., 2012).
Democrats may be more likely to intervene in the economy to create good jobs, but they
are reluctant to offer corporate welfare to help businesses without creating better jobs
(Betz et al., 2012). Previous studies support this argument. Specifically, Lewis (2002)
suggests that a city with Democratic leaders is less likely to offer retail-development
incentives, negatively impacting industrial recruitment and entrepreneurial strategies
(Jenkins et al., 2006).Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4: If a state has a more liberal political ideology, the state will be less likely
to adopt tax-based incentives (political factor).
State governments increasingly have been engaging in economic-development
policy to boost their economies, while facing high unemployment rates and dwindling
state tax revenue following recessions (Dewees et al., 2003). While some research
indicates that local governments with larger staffs and more expertise or experience tend
to adopt such policies, the literature has not found straightforward evidence of a
relationship between capacity and economic-incentive policy usage (York et al., 2013).
To measure government capacity, previous studies have used expenditure ratio and per
capita government expenditures (Morgan, Hoyman, & McCall, 2019). Broadly speaking,
local government revenues, expenditures, and employment levels are used as a proxy for
government capacity (Jeong & Feiock, 2006; Oh, Lee, & Bush, 2014). It is reasonable to
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ask how government capacity affects choice of tax-based incentives. On that basis, the
next hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 5: If a state has greater government capacity, such as revenue per capita, the
state will be more likely to adopt tax-based incentives (government-capacity factor).
Past literature has focused on examining a particular industry, mainly
manufacturing, and tends to generalize its determinants to entire economic-development
programs (Felix & Hines, 2013). Other studies also support this argument (Byrnes et al.,
1999; Reese, 2006; Wang, 2018). Another determinant in explaining economicdevelopment activity choices entails declines in certain economic sectors (Wolman &
Spitzley, 1996). The U.S. manufacturing industry has been suffering since the 1980s,
especially in Midwestern states collectively called the Rust Belt. In this regard, it is
reasonable to ask how a community’s manufacturing industry impacts the adoption of
economic incentives. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed.
Hypothesis 6: If a state has a larger manufacturing base, it will be more likely to adopt
tax-based incentives (industry factor).
Finally, the literature has identified the neighbor effect on fiscal policies. For
instance, Anderson and Wassmer (1995) provided evidence that a community adopts
property tax abatement in response to other communities’ adoption of property tax
abatement. Felix and Hines (2013) reached similar conclusions, that if a community is
closer to state borders, the community is more likely to offer business incentives. The
main purpose of analyzing the neighbor effect and strategic interaction is to test whether
economic development policy is partly influenced by competition among neighboring
communities (Byrne, 2005). Although we confirm the neighbor effect on incentives, we
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do not know the extent to which neighboring business incentives affect communities, as
previous literature is limited in this regard. We propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: If neighboring states offer more tax-based incentives, a state is more likely
to offer more tax-based incentives via the neighbor effect.
4.2.3

Research Design

This study’s objective is to examine why state governments adopt tax-based
incentives. This section describes data sources, key variables, and a model that will be
used in the analysis.
4.2.3.1 Data
The study period covers 1990 through 2015. The primary data source is the
Upjohn Institute Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (PDIT, from the W.E. Upjohn
Institute, 2019). Economist Tim Bartik played a central role in developing this unique
database, which includes taxes and incentive data for 45 industries and 32 states.
Although data-collection limits prevent the PDIT from including every state and industry,
the 32 states examined account for 92% of U.S. GDP, and the 45 industries examined
encompass 91% of U.S. compensation (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2019). There is a practical
reason for why not all states are included. Specifically, Bartik (2017) explained that 50%
more researcher’s work is needed to cover all states, but 18 states alone account for a
minor portion of business activities. The PDIT does not include all incentives, but does
contain the five most commonly used: investment tax credits, research and development
(R&D) tax credits, job-creation tax credits, property tax abatements, and customized
grants (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2019). State-corruption data are from the Public Integrity
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Section of the Department of Justice. The state-corruption rate indicates “the number of
public officials in the state in which a community is located convicted of federal
corruption-related crimes” (Felix & Hines, 2013, p. 84). To measure state government
ideology, this paper is based on Berry et al. (2010). A government’s ideology is
evaluated based on average elected officials (Berry et al., 2010). Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE)
conducted the evaluation (Berry et al., 2010). The first version of the data is based on
COPE and ADA scores that are unadjusted interest-group ratings (Berry et al., 2010).
After updating, state government ideology data are based on NOMINATE3 commonspace scores.
To analyze the neighbor effect and measure neighbor business incentives, this
paper uses a method similar to previous studies. For instance, Besley and Case (1992)
referenced the average tax change of geographically neighboring states when they
defined the neighbors’ tax change; this paper comparably defines neighboring average
total tax incentives. Neighboring average total tax incentives indicate the average
geographically neighboring state tax-based incentive percentage. The secondary data
sources for socioeconomic variables are the Decennial Census and American Community
Survey, while data on state government expenditures are taken from the Annual Survey
of State and Local Finances. The details are presented in Table 4.1.

This is “ an aggregate measure that accounts for partisan affiliation and power in the governor and state
legislature” (Leiser, 2017, p 345).
3
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Table 4.1 Variable definition and data sources
Dependent
Variables

Variable
Total Incentives (sum of the
following five variables)
Job Creation Tax Credit

Investment Tax Credit

Research and Development
(R&D) Tax Credit
Property Tax Abatement

Customized Job Training
Subsidy
Independent
Variables

Poverty rates

Unemployment rate
Percentage Public Assistance

Neighboring average total tax
incentive

State Corruption rate
Government ideology indicator

Revenue per capita
Percentage Infrastructure
Expenditure
Percentage Welfare Expenditure

Percentage of Manufacturing
Employment

Control
Variables

Percentage BA Degree or
higher
Percentage Over 65
Median Income (log)

Definition
The Percentage of Tax incentives
of State-local Business Taxes
The Percentage of Tax incentives
of State-local Business Taxes by
Job Creation tax credit
The Percentage of Tax incentives
of State-local Business Taxes by
Investment Tax credit
The Percentage of Tax incentives
of State-local Business Taxes by
R&D tax credit
The Percentage of Tax incentives
of State-local Business Taxes by
Property Tax Abatement
The Percentage of Tax incentives
of State-local Business Taxes by
Customized Job Training
The ratio of the number of people
whose income falls below the
poverty line
The Percentage of unemployed
workers
The Percentage of Households
with cash public assistance or
Food Stamps
The average Percentage of Tax
incentives of neighboring Statelocal Business Taxes
Public Corruption Convictions per
100,000 population
Conservative (0) to Liberal (100)

Revenue divided by population
The percentage of transportation
and highways expenditure in total
revenue
The percentage of social service
and public welfare expenditure in
total revenue
Manufacturing as a share of
employment

Percentage of population with
bachelor’s degree or higher
Percentage of population 65 years
and over
Median log of income in dollars
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Data Source
Panel Database on
Incentives and Taxes
(PDIT 1990, 2000,
2005-2015)

US Decennial Census
(1990, 2000, and
2010) and ACS
(2005-2009, 20112015)

Panel Database on
Incentives and Taxes,
(PDIT 1990, 2000,
2005-2015)
Department of Justice
Berry et al., 2010,
and Fording’s
website
Government Finance
Database (Pierson,
Hand, & Thompson,
2015a)

US Decennial Census
(1990, 2000, and
2010) and ACS
(2005-2009, 20112015)
US Decennial Census
(1990, 2000, and
2010) and ACS
(2005-2009, 20112015)

4.2.3.2 Variables
Dependent Variable
This paper examines five widely used tax-based incentives: job-creation tax
credits, investment tax credits, R&D tax credits, property tax abatements, and customized
job-training grants. The unit-of-incentive measure is the percentage4 of tax incentives
compared with state and local business taxes. To clarify, “The measure shows present
value of incentives divided by present value of gross taxes” (Bartik, 2017, p. 47). In other
words, it measures to what extent a state uses incentives: A high value denotes heavy use
of incentives. As Figure 4.1 shows, the primary dependent variable includes total
incentives and each type of business incentive from 1990 to 2015. The total value of
incentives is the sum of the value of job-creation tax credits, investment tax credits, R&D
tax credits, property tax abatements, and customized job-training subsidies. Figure 4.1
shows the trend of business incentives included in this study. Generally, state government
average total use of tax incentives has increased steadily since 1990, but the when and
where of the incentives vary. The use of job-creation tax credits has grown between 2005
and 2015, but the use of other incentives has remained static. States have invested less in
R&D tax credits and customized job-training subsidies but have spent comparatively
more in investment tax credits and property tax abatements.

4

“Present value calculated using 12 percent discount rate for new facility begun in 2015 and operated at
same scale for 20 years” (Bartik, 2017, p. 47).
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The trend of total incentives between 1990 and 2015
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Figure 4.1 The trend in total incentives between 1990 and 2015.
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Figure 4.2 The trend in business incentives between 1990 and 2015

Independent Variables
Many studies use socioeconomic factors to analyze determinants of tax-based
incentives (Sullivan, 2002; Dewees et al., 2003; Felix & Hines, 2013; Fleischmann et al.,
1992;. Reese, 2006; Rubin & Rubin, 1987). Based on previous studies, the primary
independent variables include poverty rate, percentage of public assistance, and
unemployment rate as socioeconomic factors, and as political factors, state-corruption
rate and government-ideology indicators. Percentage of infrastructure expenditures,
percentage of welfare expenditures, and revenue per capita measure state government
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capacity. The share of employment in manufacturing is a state industry factor. Lastly,
neighboring average total tax incentive is included as a neighbor effect.
Control Variables
The relationship between tax-based incentives and the primary independent
variable is tested while controlling for demographic characteristics and environmental
context. The demographic characteristics include percentage of bachelor’s degrees or
higher and percentage 65 years old and up. The percentage over 65 years old is controlled
because older people are more likely to be active political participants (Rork, 2003). The
environmental context includes a set of variables indicating a state’s income level:
median income and manufacturing income. The details on all variables are presented in
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

VARIABLES

Sample
size

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Total Incentives

416

26.80

20.88

0.00

99.44

Job Creation Tax Credit

416

9.59

11.49

0.00

57.44

Investment Tax Credit

416

6.42

12.84

0.00

72.04

R&D Tax Credit

416

2.08

2.46

0.00

12.35

Property Tax Abatement

416

7.16

9.63

0.00

43.69

Customized Job Training Subsidy

416

1.55

1.81

0.00

6.89

Poverty rate

416

13.54

3.57

5.00

21.90

Government Ideology Indicator

416

46.95

16.34

17.51

73.62

% Over65

416

12.99

1.56

9.20

18.60

% BA or Higher

416

26.97

5.31

13.63

40.50

Unemployment Rate

416

7.14

2.18

2.46

12.70

% Infrastructure Expenditure

416

6.29

2.12

1.80

17.77

% Public Assistance

416

10.05

3.91

1.71

24.15

% Welfare Expenditure

416

22.93

4.18

7.48

38.78

Median income (log)

416

10.83

0.25

10.00

11.45

State Corruption rate (Federal Public Corruption
Convictions per 100,000)

416

0.32

0.23

0.00

1.24

% of Manufacturing Employment

416

12.01

4.52

3.60

26.69

Revenue per capita (log)

416

5.74

1.79

1.52

10.65

Total incentives in neighboring states

416

27.98

14.39

0.46

61.99

Note: Data includes 32 states over 13 years

4.2.3.3 Model
This study uses fixed-effects panel estimates for 32 U.S. states between 1990 and
2015 to examine what makes tax-based incentives attractive to policy makers. The
purpose of this method is to control time-invariant characteristics of states that could
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have impacts on the use of tax incentives. Allison (2009) explains ‘the fixed effects
methods effectively controls for all time invariant predictors, both measured and
unmeasured’ (p.26). One way to explore determinants of tax-based incentives in U.S.
states is to include all control variables in a year the same as the dependent variable.
However, a potential problem is that the incentives and other control variables,
specifically government-expenditure variables, are likely to be endogenous because state
government officials may decide on the types and amount of government expenditures to
use in year t based on the amount of tax incentives in year t-1. Therefore, this study uses
lagged values for independent variables to address the potential endogeneity issue. The
methodology used in this study is consistent with previous studies (Gittell & Tebaldi,
2007; Gittell et al., 2014). Also, this study includes year fixed effects to control for
macroeconomic and political factors that could impact the trend of tax incentives at the
national level. The following model is estimated:
Tax incentives it = β1 Socioecoit-1 + β2 Gov’t Capacityit-1 + β3 Politicit-1 + β4 Industryit-1 +
β5 Neighboringit- + β6 Xit-1 + αi + dt+ εit
in which i indexes state, t indexes time, tax incentives indicate the percentage of tax
incentives relative to total state and local business taxes within a state i in year t. It
measures to what extent a state uses incentives. The parameter 𝛽 1 measures the effect of
socioeconomic variables on tax-based incentives, and β2, β3, β4 and β5 measure the
primary independent variable effects on incentives. Other covariates that capture a state’s
socioeconomic conditions and likely affect tax incentives are included in vector Xi,t-1.
Finally, 𝛼i denotes a set of state-fixed effects, dt indicates a set of year-fixed effects, and
𝜀 is the error term.
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4.2.4

Results

4.2.4.1 Primary Determinants
Table 4.3 shows the results from panel fixed-effects estimates on primary
determinants and a series of control variables. The coefficients in five subcategories add
up to the total effect estimated overall because the dependent variables are defined as
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subcategories. Column 1 in Table 4.3 indicates that
socioeconomic factors such as percentage of public assistance and poverty rate have no
statistically significant effect on the total use of tax-based incentives. This result does not
support findings in previous studies that socioeconomic factors have a statistically
significant effect on the total use of tax-based incentives (Betz et al., 2012; Lobao &
Kraybill, 2005). However, the results differ by category. Specifically, the findings show
that a 1% increase in the poverty rate increases the average percentage of investment tax
incentives in gross taxes by 0.77%, holding all other variables constant. The
unemployment rate statistically reduces the percentage of customized job-training
subsidies from gross taxes. This result supports the contention that economically poor
local governments may find it difficult to invest resources in economic-development
strategies (Dewees et al., 2003; Reese, 2006).
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4.3 show the effect of political factors on the use of taxbased incentives. This study did not find statistically significant evidence that a rise in the
state corruption rate would increase the use of tax-based incentives. On the other hand,
the government-ideology score impacted the use of tax-based incentives. The findings
show a 1-point increase in state government ideology score (high score = more liberal,
range = 100 points) increases the percentage of job creation tax credits from gross taxes
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by 0.09%. Liberalism in a given state increases the use of job-creation tax credits, but
reduces investment tax credits, property-tax abatement, and customized job-training
subsidies. A state government’s ideology has a statistically significant impact on the type
of tax-based incentives. We can suggest that government ideology could serve as a
powerful mechanism in the allocation of tax-based incentives.
Three variables measure state government capacity. The findings vary depending
on the type of tax-based incentives involved. First, revenue per capita increases the use of
R&D tax credits and statistically decreases the use of property tax abatement. Second, the
percentage of infrastructure expenditures has no statistical impact on the type of taxbased incentive.
Finally, the percentage of welfare expenditures is positively associated with total
incentives and investment tax credits. Although these results partially support previous
studies that indicate the level of government capacity is closely related to the use of taxbased incentives, they also indicate that capacity has different effects based on the type of
expenditure and incentives (York et al., 2013).
Table 3 shows that the percentage of manufacturing employment does not support
the findings of previous studies. As the percentage of manufacturing employment
increases, total incentives, job creation tax credit, and property tax abatements decrease.
Considering the U.S. manufacturing industry’s condition, this finding is especially
surprising. Perhaps communities have observed that manufacturing industry often leaves
in later years and doubt the long-term value of the investment.
Neighboring states’ average tax incentives have an unexpected impact on the use
of business incentives. That is, as the percentage of their average tax incentives increases,
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total incentives and job creation tax credit decrease. This result is contrary to previous
studies and may suggest that competition strategies among the states may not trigger taxbased incentives. This result suggests the possibility that the empirical data indicating
that tax-based incentives are not effective may be utilized as a control mechanism in local
governments. In other words, learning mechanisms demonstrating the ineffectiveness of
incentives may arrest the spread of adoption. Additionally, a negative relationship
between the use of the neighboring states’ total incentives and the extent of these
incentives may suggest that these tax-based incentives are substitutes rather than
complements to each state.
4.2.4.2 Control Variables
Demographic factors partially impact the use of incentives. Specifically, the
percentage of residents with bachelor’s degrees or higher reduces the use of R&D tax
credits and customized job-training subsidies, and median income reduces the use of
customized job training subsidies. However, the percentage of residents over age 65 has
no statistically significant effect on tax incentives.

114

Table 4.3 Panel regression results: The effect of determinants on the tax-based incentives
VARIABLES

Government Ideology
Indicator (high: liberal) t-1
State Corruption rate
(Public Corruption
Conviction per 100,000) t-1
Revenue per capita(log) t-1
% Infrastructure
Expenditure t-1
.% Welfare Expenditure t-1
% BA or Higher t-1
% Over 65% t-1
Neighbor effect t-1
Median income (log) t-1
Unemployment Rate t-1
Poverty Rate t-1
% Public Assistance t-1
% of Manufacturing
Employment t-1
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of states

(1)
Total
Incentives

(3)
Investment
Tax Credit

(4)
R&D
Tax
Credit

-0.03
(0.04)
-2.17
(2.65)

(2)
Job
Creation
Tax
Credit
0.09***
(0.03)
-2.93
(1.87)

(6)
Customized
Job Training
Subsidy

0.00
(0.00)
-0.22
(0.31)

(5)
Property
Tax
Abateme
nt
-0.09***
(0.03)
-0.12
(1.66)

-0.03*
(0.01)
0.97
(0.99)

0.04
(0.70)
-0.00
(0.38)
0.54**
(0.26)
0.36
(0.91)
-0.09
(1.67)
-0.18**
(0.08)
4.61
(22.00)
-2.33***
(0.89)
1.29
(0.81)
0.35
(0.37)
-1.40***
(0.50)

0.76
(0.50)
0.15
(0.27)
-0.00
(0.18)
0.29
(0.64)
-0.58
(1.18)
-0.10*
(0.06)
21.20
(15.50)
-1.18*
(0.62)
0.73
(0.57)
0.31
(0.26)
-0.62*
(0.35)

-0.11
(0.26)
0.13
(0.14)
0.28***
(0.10)
0.49
(0.34)
0.66
(0.62)
-0.02
(0.03)
-9.62
(8.21)
-0.76**
(0.33)
0.77**
(0.30)
-0.04
(0.14)
0.27
(0.19)

0.15*
(0.08)
0.06
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.19*
(0.11)
-0.17
(0.19)
-0.01
(0.01)
-1.51
(2.55)
-0.10
(0.10)
-0.11
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.08
(0.06)

-0.83**
(0.44)
-0.33
(0.24)
0.25
(0.16)
-0.10
(0.57)
-0.06
(1.05)
-0.05
(0.05)
-1.33
(13.83)
-0.18
(0.56)
-0.01
(0.51)
0.06
(0.24)
-0.99***
(0.31)

0.07
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.12*
(0.06)
0.06
(0.12)
-0.00
(0.01)
-4.13***
(1.53)
-0.11*
(0.06)
-0.08
(0.06)
0.02
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)

Yes
Yes
-18.34
(235.18)
384
0.19
32

Yes
Yes
-211.42
(165.65)
384
0.22
32

Yes
Yes
73.68
(87.80)
384
0.10
32

Yes
Yes
23.66
(27.11)
384
0.08
32

Yes
Yes
25.57
(147.81)
384
0.11
32

Yes
Yes
46.73***
(16.37)
384
0.16
32

-0.01***
(0.00)
0.13
(0.18)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The coefficients in
the total incentives regression are the sums of the coefficients in the five subcategories, as
they are defined as mutually exclusive and exhaustive subcategories
4.3

Conclusion

While many studies argue that tax incentives have a negligible impact on local
economies, tax incentives have long played a role in economic-development policy in the
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U.S. and continue to be a popular policy tool used by state and local governments. Recent
competition to attract Amazon’s second headquarters reveals how governments are
willing to offer billions of dollars in tax breaks and other subsidies to attract such
corporations. The designation of opportunity zones in low-income neighborhoods is in
line with tax-based incentive policy because they offer preferential tax treatment to
investors.
A state government’s prevailing political ideology influences the choice of
economic-development activities, indicating that political conditions play an important
role in state economic policy. Thus, a more liberal state may be more likely to discourage
the use of investment tax credits, property tax abatement, and customized job-training
subsidies. The empirical results in my study show that local politics could be an
important factor that increases or decreases the use of economic development policies.
According to previous results, the form of government, changes in political leadership,
and the government ideology indicator influence the use of economic development
policies. It is worth noting that local government factors have acted as a major selective
force in economic development policies. Specifically, any local politics does not
consistently have a significant impact on the use of policies, but the results show which
factors have a significant relationship in the local area. Elective influence of local
government is the main contribution of this dissertation. This study also finds that state
economic conditions are inversely related to the use of incentives. For example, as
unemployment rates increase, state governments are likely to decrease their total
incentives, job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, and customized job-training
subsidies. This result could imply the prevalence of political factors in the use of
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incentives. Finally, the extent of tax-based incentives in neighboring states reduces the
total use of tax incentives. These results suggest that tax-based incentives may be a
substitute among states, or perhaps the ineffectiveness of the incentives is observed by
neighboring states.
Only a few national studies have been conducted on this question. Using new data
on nationwide tax incentives at the state level, this study examined determinants of tax
incentives across the U.S. over time. Both political and economic factors are associated
with business-incentive policies.
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CHAPTER 5. THE EFFECTS OF STATE TAX-BASED INCENTIVES ON U.S. LABOR MARKETS,
1990–2015: BOON OR BOONDOGGLE?

Abstract
Clear evidence about the effectiveness of economic development incentives is limited. To
bridge this research gap, this study uses the Upjohn Institute Panel Database on
Incentives and Taxes (PDIT). Unemployment and employment rates are used to analyze
the effectiveness of tax-based incentives. Statistical results indicate that tax incentives
have a marginal impact on employment status and limited benefits to states. Only the
R&D tax credit statistically significantly increases employment rates. This result supports
the interpretation of economic development policies as a zero-sum game.
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5.1

Introduction

Many states and local governments in the United States offer economic
development incentives to boost their local area. The effectiveness of these incentives is
an emerging issue (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). The analysis is based on two underlying
reasons. First, each state needs to increase the number of jobs available to overcome the
Great Recession (Bartik, 2001). Second, billions of dollars have been spent on incentives
across the nation (Peters & Fisher, 2004). Despite the importance of this issue, we do not
have clear information about the effectiveness of economic development incentives
because the literature shows opposing results.
Previous studies argue that tax incentives positively impact local investment,
economic growth, and employment (Hollenbeck, 2008; Holzer et al., 1993; Hoyt, Jepsen,
& Troske, 2008). On the contrary, other studies report that business incentives do not
significantly impact local areas (Boarnet & Bogart, 1996; Carlton, 1983). Therefore,
previous studies only partially addressed the question whether economic development
incentives are effective.
Accordingly, this paper aims to contribute to the field of business incentives by
posing the following research questions: (1) How important are tax incentives to overall
unemployment rate and employment rate by state? (2) What is the impact of incentives
on the unemployment rate and employment rate of states? The first section outlines the
research design. The next section analyzes the results, and the final section offers
conclusions.
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5.2

Research Design

The aim of this study is to examine the effects of state tax-based incentives on
economic performance measured as the unemployment rate and employment rate of U.S.
states over time. Additionally, this article empirically tests the proposition that economic
development policies have the nature of a zero-sum game. This section discusses data,
key variables, and a model that will be used for analysis.
5.2.1

Data

The study period is from 1990 to 2015. The primary data source is the Upjohn
Institute Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (PDIT). The PDIT includes the five
most commonly used tax-based incentives: investment tax credits, research and
development (R&D) tax credits, job creation tax credits, property tax abatements, and
customized grants (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2019). The secondary data sources for
socioeconomic variables are the Decennial Census and American Community Survey,
while data on state government expenditures are taken from the Government Finance
Database. The details are presented in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 Variable definitions and data sources
Dependent
variable

Independent
Variables

Variable
Unemployment Rate
Employment Rate

Definition
The percentage of
unemployment within a state
The percentage of
employment within a state

Total Incentives (sum of
the following five
variables)

The percentage of Tax
incentives of State-local
Business taxes

Job Creation Tax Credit

The Percentage of Tax
incentives of State-local
Business Taxes by Job
Creation tax credit
The Percentage of Tax
incentives of State-local
Business Taxes by
Investment Tax credit
The Percentage of Tax
incentives of State-local
Business Taxes by R&D tax
credit
The Percentage of Tax
incentives of State-local
Business Taxes by Property
Tax Abatement
The Percentage of Tax
incentives of State-local
Business Taxes by
Customized Job Training
Subsidy
The percentage of
households with cash public
assistance or Food Stamps
The percentage of
households in owner
occupied housing
Median housing value in
dollars
Total population
Under 5 year (%)
65 years and over (%)
Median income in dollars
Percent bachelor’s degree or
higher
The percentage of education
expenditure in total revenue
The percentage of
transportation and highways
expenditure in total revenue
The percentage of social
service and public welfare
expenditure in total revenue

Investment Tax Credit

Research and Development
(R&D) Credit
Property Tax Abatement

Customized Job Training
Subsidy

Control
Variables

% Public Assistance
% of owner occupied
housing
Housing value (log)
Population (log)
% Under 5
% Over 65
Median Income (log)
% BA Degree or higher
% Edu Expenditure
% Infrastructure
Expenditure
% Welfare Expenditure
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Data Source
US Decennial
Census (1990,
2000 & 2010) and
ACS (2005-2009,
2011-2015)
Panel Database on
Incentives and
Taxes, PDIT
(1990, 2000, &
2005-2015)

US Decennial
Census (1990,
2000 & 2010) and
ACS (1990, 20052009, 2011-2015)

Annual Survey of
State, Local
Finance (20002015)
Government
Finance Database
(Pierson et al.,
2015b)

5.2.2

Variables

Dependent Variable
Many studies use employment indicators to evaluate the effect of incentives
(Ham, Swenson, Imrohorǧlu, & Song, 2011; Hanson & Rohlin, 2013; Reynolds &
Rohlin, 2015). Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) use percentage change in employment as
a dependent variable to determine the effect of the business climate on the state economy.
Bartolome and Spiegel (1997) rely on the level of employment to evaluate the effects of
economic development agency spending. Gabe and Kraybill (2002) use unemployment
rates to analyze the effect of state business incentives. Accordingly, this study also uses
employment indicators as outcome variables. To measure the effect of state business
incentives on the state economy, the unemployment and employment rate are used as the
dependent variables because those indicators represent the effect of the incentives overall.
As shown in Table 5.2, states in this sample average a 7.14% unemployment rate. The
range of unemployment rate is between 2.46% and 12.70%.
Independent Variables
This study also examines five tax-based incentives: R&D tax credits, job-creation
tax credits, property tax abatements, investment tax credits, and customized job-training
grants. The unit of incentive measure is the percentage of tax incentives of state-local
business taxes. It measures the extent to which a state government uses incentives, with a
high value indicating a high use of incentives. One of the key strengths of this database is
that it is exceptionally comprehensive because it covers the majority of business activities
from 1990 to 2015, which is a relatively long period.
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics
Variables

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Employment rate

416

59.94

3.60

52.50

68.20

Unemployment Rate

416

7.14

2.19

2.46

12.70

Total Incentives

416

26.80

20.88

0.00

99.44

Job Creation Tax Credit

416

9.59

11.49

0.00

57.44

Investment Tax Credit

416

6.42

12.84

0.00

72.04

Research and Development Credit

416

2.08

2.46

0.00

12.35

Property Tax Abatement

416

7.16

9.63

0.00

43.69

Customized Job Training Subsidy

416

1.55

1.81

0.00

6.89

Poverty rate

416

13.54

3.57

5.00

21.90

% Owner Occupied Housing

416

67.25

4.46

52.20

76.30

Housing Value (log)

416

12.02

0.45

10.73

13.19

Population

416

15.69

0.68

13.99

17.46

% Under Age 5

416

6.66

0.57

5.30

8.40

% Over Age 65

416

12.99

1.56

9.20

18.60

Median Income (log)

416

10.83

0.25

9.99

11.45

% BA Degree or higher

416

26.97

5.30

13.63

40.50

% Edu Expenditure

416

28.72

7.66

6.73

44.22

% Infrastructure Expenditure

416

6.29

2.12

1.80

17.77

% Welfare Expenditure

416

22.93

4.18

7.48

38.78

Control Variables
Many studies that examine the employment effects of tax incentives include several
control variables that measure socioeconomic characteristics and government
expenditures, including public education, infrastructure, and welfare. Wasylenko and
McGuire (1985) separate their control variables into three categories: labor, fiscal, and
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market. The labor category includes prime working age population (age 25 to 55); the
fiscal category includes a set of variables that indicate state and local governments’
expenditure on education and welfare; and the market category includes state population
density and per capita state income. Freedman (2012) similarly categorizes control
variables: demographic characteristics, housing characteristics, and change in
neighborhood characteristics. The demographic characteristics include the population, the
number of persons under age 5, the number over age 65, median income, and poverty
rate. Housing characteristics include the share of owner-occupied housing, and median
household income and median housing value are included to measure neighborhood
characteristics.
As many other previous studies also follow this pattern (Goss & Phillips, 1999;
Ham et al., 2011; Hanson, 2009; Hanson & Rohlin, 2013; Reynolds & Rohlin, 2015), this
study includes a set of variables that measure each state’s socioeconomic characteristics
and government expenditures on public services. Over the study period, the average
poverty rate is 13.54% across 32 states. Population, age structure, education, and median
household income, are also used as socioeconomic characteristics. This study also
includes variables related to housing, such as the percentage of owner-occupied housing
and median housing values, because the quality of the neighborhood is capitalized in
housing if the housing market works efficiently. As Table 5.2 shows, the average
percentage of owner-occupied housing was 67.25% over the study period. Finally, three
variables that measure state government spending on public education, infrastructure, and
welfare are included because the level of government expenditure is closely related to the
local economy (Wasylenko & McGuire, 1985). The details are presented in Table 5.2.
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5.2.3

Model

This study uses fixed-effects panel estimates for 32 U.S. states in each year
between 1990 and 2015 to examine the effects of incentives on unemployment rate and
employment rate. The first model presented below applies to unemployment rates, and
the second model applies to employment rates. Each model estimates the effects of total
tax incentives and sub-five categories of tax incentives, respectively. One way to evaluate
the effects of tax incentives on unemployment rate and employment rate is to include all
control variables in a year as the same as the dependent variable. However, a potential
endogeneity problem may exist, because state government officials may decide the types
and amount of tax incentives to use in year t based on employment status in year t-1.
Therefore, this paper uses lagged values for independent variables to address the potential
endogeneity issue. The following models are estimated:

Unemployment ratei,t = 𝛽 0 + 𝛽 1Tax Incentivei,t-1 + 𝛽 2 Socioecoi,t-1 + 𝛽 3 Gov’tCapacityi,t-1
+ 𝛽 4 Industryi,t-1 𝛽 5 Xi,t-1 + 𝛼i + dt+ 𝜀i,t
Employment ratei,t = 𝛽 0 + 𝛽 1Tax Incentivei,t-1 + 𝛽 2 Socioecoi,t-1 + 𝛽 3 Gov’tCapacityi,t-1 +
𝛽 4 Industryi,t-1 𝛽 5 Xi,t-1 + 𝛼i + dt + 𝜀i,t
where i indexes states, t indexes time, and Incentive measures the percentage of tax
incentives of state-local business taxes. The parameter 𝛽 1 measures the effect of tax
incentives on unemployment rate and employment rate. All other covariates that capture
a state’s socioeconomic conditions that likely affect employment are in vector Xi,t-1.
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Finally, 𝛼i denotes a set of state fixed effects, dt indicates a set of year fixed effects and 𝜀
is the error term.

5.3

Results

Tax-based Incentives
Table 5.3 shows the results of a regression analysis on the effects of business
incentives on the unemployment rate in 32 states from 1990 to 2015. Column 1 in Table
5.3 is the results of the OLS analysis, and Column 2 reveals the results of panel fixedeffects estimates on the use of tax incentives and a series of control variables. The panel
fixed-effect model is preferable to the OLS model.
Although OLS shows a 1% increase in total tax incentives is likely to reduce the
average unemployment rate by 0.01%, holding all other variables constant, when state
and year fixed effects are included, the negative effects of tax incentives on
unemployment rate disappear. In other words, the sign of the coefficient on total
incentives was positive and statistically insignificant. There is significant variation
between states and over time.
Table 5.4 shows the results of five regression analyses on state unemployment
rate using five tax-based incentives as key independent variables. Column 1, the
employment effects of job-creation tax credits, does not support findings in previous
studies that the incentive has a statistically significant effect on the unemployment rate
(Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). Considering that the average use of job-creation tax credits in
U.S. states has more than doubled between 2000 and 2015, this finding is especially
surprising.
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Column 2 of Table 5.4 shows the employment effects of investment tax credits
and a positive coefficient on tax credits. Moreover, this study did not find statistically
significant evidence that an increase in investment tax credits would reduce
unemployment rates, as standard economic theory suggests. Conversely, the results show
that investment tax credits statistically increase unemployment. These results suggest that
investment tax credit does not influence employment because it is usually related to a
specific asset, such as equipment. Similarly, column 3 reports the effects of R&D tax
credits and shows no significant decrease in unemployment rate. As shown in Columns 4
and 5, this study also did not find a significant effect of providing grants for property tax
abatements and customized job training subsidy. These findings suggest that untargeted
incentives based on whether an industry provides jobs, wages, or R&D do not
significantly affect employment. Targeted incentives, such as customized job training,
failed to achieve the intended policy outcome. Note that state governments have invested
heavily in this field.
Across all models, this study finds consistent evidence on the effects of
socioeconomic characteristics on the unemployment rate in U.S. states. Briefly, the
results indicate the poverty rate and population size have a positive effect on the
unemployment rate. On the other hand, the percentage of owner occupied housing has a
negative effect on the unemployment rate.
This study included three variables that measure state government expenditures
on education, infrastructure, and welfare, as many previous studies argue that the level of
government expenditure is closely related to employment status in the local labor market.
While the findings vary depending on the types of expenditure examined, most found that
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higher spending on education tends to have a positive impact on employment factors such
as job growth (Wasylenko & McGuire, 1985). However, across all models, this study
demonstrates that state expenditure on education does not statistically significantly
impact the unemployment rate. Results of this study also indicate a higher share of state
spending on infrastructure positively and statistically significantly affects the
unemployment rate. Additionally, the findings show an increase in welfare spending
increases the unemployment rate.
Table 5.3 OLS and panel regression results: The effects of total incentives on unemployment
rates
Unemployment rates
(1)
(2)
-0.01**
0.01
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.37***
0.37***
(0.02)
(0.05)
-0.01
-0.11**
(0.02)
(0.05)
0.53*
-0.34
(0.32)
(0.40)
0.30***
2.27***
(0.10)
(0.70)
-1.66***
-1.01***
(0.19)
(0.19)
-0.12*
0.16
(0.07)
(0.12)
1.44***
-0.72
(0.46)
(1.64)
-0.06**
0.09
(0.02)
(0.06)
0.03**
0.01
(0.01)
(0.02)
-0.15***
0.06**
(0.04)
(0.03)
-0.03*
0.03
(0.02)
(0.02)
No
Yes
No
Yes
-8.59*
-14.34
(4.71)
(17.47)
384
384
0.68
0.93

VARIABLES
Total Incentives t-1
Poverty rate t-1
% of Owner Occupied Housing t-1
Housing Value (log) t-1
Population (log) t-1
% Under 5 t-1
% Over 65 t-1
Median Income (log) t-1
% BA or higher t-1
% Edu Expenditure t-1
% Infrastructure Expenditure t-1
% Welfare Expenditure t-1
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.4 Panel regression results: The effects of each tax incentives on unemployment
rate
VARIABLES
Job Creation Tax Credit t-1

Unemployment Rate
(2)
(3)
(4)

(1)

Investment Tax Credit t-1

0.01**
(0.01)

Research and Development Credit t-1

-0.04
(0.03)

Property Tax Abatement t-1

-0.00
(0.01)

Customized Job Training Subsidy t-1
Poverty rate t-1
% of Owner Occupied Housing t-1
Housing Value (log) t-1
Population (log) t-1
% Under 5 t-1
% Over 65 t-1
Median Income (log) t-1
% BA or higher t-1
% Edu Expenditure t-1
% Infrastructure Expenditure t-1
% Welfare Expenditure t-1
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(5)

0.01
(0.01)

0.37***
(0.05)
-0.13**
(0.05)
-0.29
(0.40)
2.15***
(0.69)
-0.70
(1.65)
0.17
(0.12)
-0.70
(1.65)
0.08
(0.06)
0.01
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.03)
0.03*
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
-12.77
(17.41)

0.37***
(0.05)
-0.10*
(0.05)
-0.30
(0.40)
2.23***
(0.69)
-0.99
(1.64)
0.17
(0.12)
-0.99
(1.64)
0.09
(0.06)
0.01
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.03)
0.03
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
-12.10
(17.27)

0.36***
(0.06)
-0.11**
(0.05)
-0.34
(0.40)
2.01***
(0.68)
-0.88
(1.65)
0.19
(0.12)
-0.88
(1.65)
0.08
(0.06)
0.01
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.03)
0.03*
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
-9.43
(17.36)

0.36***
(0.06)
-0.13**
(0.05)
-0.28
(0.41)
2.01***
(0.69)
-0.75
(1.65)
0.19
(0.12)
-0.75
(1.65)
0.08
(0.06)
0.01
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.03)
0.03*
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
-10.47
(17.40)

-0.05
(0.05)
0.36***
(0.06)
-0.12**
(0.05)
-0.31
(0.40)
1.97***
(0.69)
-0.95
(1.66)
0.16
(0.12)
-0.95
(1.66)
0.07
(0.07)
0.01
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.03)
0.03*
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
-7.21
(17.64)

384
0.93

384
0.93

384
0.93

384
0.93

384
0.93

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.5 shows the results of six regression analyses on state employment rate
using total incentives and the five tax-based incentives as key independent variables. The
results are similar to the previous results on unemployment rate. The finding shows that a
1% increase in R&D tax credit is likely to increase the average employment rate by
0.09%. This study suggests that tax incentives marginally impact the employment rate.
Conversely, investment tax credits negatively impact the employment rate. Similar to the
case of unemployment, this result could support the interpretation of economic policies as
a zero-sum game because the total sum of the effect of tax-based incentives on
employment status is close to zero.
Based on the previous results, socioeconomic characteristics statistically influence
the employment rate. Briefly, the results indicate that median housing value, poverty rate,
and share of population over 65 negatively affect the unemployment rate. Contrarily,
share of population under age 5 and owner-occupied housing positively influence the
employment rate.
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Table 5.5 Panel regression results: The effects of each tax incentives on employment rate
VARIABLES
Total Incentives t-1

(1)
-0.00
(0.00)

Job Creation Tax Credit t-1

(2)

(3)

Employment Rate
(4)
(5)

0.01
(0.01)

Investment Tax Credit t-1

-0.02**
(0.01)

R&D Credit t-1

0.09***
(0.03)

Property Tax Abatement t-1

-0.00
(0.01)

Customized Job Training Subsidy t-1
Poverty rate t-1
% of Owner Occupied Housing t-1
Housing Value (log) t-1
Population (log) t-1
% Under 5 t-1
% Over 65 t-1
Median Income (log) t-1
% BA or higher t-1
% Edu Expenditure t-1
% Infrastructure Expenditure t-1
% Welfare Expenditure t-1
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(6)

-0.54***
(0.06)
0.31***
(0.05)
-1.57***
(0.41)
0.11
(0.72)
0.39*
(0.20)
-0.74***
(0.12)
0.96
(1.70)
-0.13*
(0.07)
-0.00
(0.02)
0.03
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
61.23***
(18.02)
384
0.88

-0.53***
(0.06)
0.30***
(0.05)
-1.55***
(0.41)
0.31
(0.71)
0.36*
(0.20)
-0.76***
(0.12)
1.00
(1.69)
-0.12*
(0.07)
-0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
58.11***
(17.88)
384
0.88

-0.54***
(0.06)
0.29***
(0.05)
-1.58***
(0.41)
-0.09
(0.70)
0.44**
(0.20)
-0.73***
(0.12)
1.28
(1.68)
-0.14**
(0.07)
-0.00
(0.02)
0.03
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
62.11***
(17.70)
384
0.88

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.52***
(0.06)
0.29***
(0.05)
-1.50***
(0.41)
0.18
(0.69)
0.36*
(0.19)
-0.77***
(0.12)
1.31
(1.67)
-0.13*
(0.07)
-0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
57.23***
(17.60)
384
0.89

-0.54***
(0.06)
0.31***
(0.05)
-1.55***
(0.42)
0.13
(0.71)
0.39*
(0.20)
-0.74***
(0.12)
0.94
(1.70)
-0.13*
(0.07)
-0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
60.98***
(17.88)
384
0.88

-0.04
(0.05)
-0.54***
(0.06)
0.31***
(0.05)
-1.57***
(0.41)
0.10
(0.71)
0.37*
(0.20)
-0.76***
(0.12)
0.78
(1.71)
-0.14**
(0.07)
-0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
63.48***
(18.14)
384
0.88

5.4

Conclusion

While many studies argue that tax incentives have a negligible impact on local
economies, tax incentives have long played a role in economic development policy in the
United States and continue to be a popular policy tool used by state and local
governments. The recent competition to attract Amazon’s second headquarters reveals
governments are willing to offer billions of dollars in tax breaks and other subsidies to
attract such corporations. The designation of opportunity zones in low-income
neighborhoods is in line with tax-based incentives policy because they offer preferential
tax treatment to investors. Despite the popularity of tax incentives, it is not yet known if
these incentives are effective.
To the best of my knowledge, only a few national studies have been conducted on
this question. Using new data on nationwide tax incentives, this study examined the
employment effects of tax incentives across the United States over time, providing more
nuanced understandings on the effects of tax incentives overall. The results of this study
show that tax incentives in general have no impact on employment, contradicting the
theory that offering tax incentives to firms will lead to job growth. However, the findings
support tax-based incentives as one of the popular economic development policies being
a zero-sum game. Results of this study could explain the opposing ideas of previous
studies on the effectiveness of tax-based incentives. It is likely that the previous studies
have analyzed only the zero-sum nature of costs and benefits. Therefore, this study
contributes to understanding the characteristics of different economic development
policies.
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CHAPTER 6. POLICY IMPLICATION AND LIMITATION OF DISSERTATION
The essays in this dissertation focus on economic development policies in the US and
offers unique contributions to the literature. First, by comprehensively reviewing extant
studies, the first essay provides a nuanced understanding of economic development
policies by using TIF. Specifically, policy makers in local government could quickly
notice the current situation of economic development policies and TIF. This is an
essential process before local government officials consider or implement economic
development policies because many governments recently tend to adopt competitive
development policies without adequate considerations. In this regard, the first chapter
helps give policy makers an opportunity to know related issues, such as policy
effectiveness. This part of TIF, which is highlighted, enables readers to comprehend the
history, mechanism, and recent studies on TIF. This would help policy makers establish
policy.
When policy makers in local governments consider economic development
policies, the first consideration may be the effectiveness policies. The second chapter
theoretically gives a foundation about the characteristics of policies. Based on TIF
policies, this chapter concludes that TIF programs have necessarily become a zero-sum
game. This feature offers meaningful implications to policy makers. For example,
adopting a new development policy in a specific area could be beneficial for the
corresponding district. However, if policy makers would look at their communities as a
whole, they could realize that doing so would not be as beneficial as they expected. This
theoretical background will help policy makers assume a cautious attitude toward
economic development policies. In other words, this chapter could call attention to
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potential problems of unorganized development policies. Additionally, upper government
levels, such as state, could have justification for intervening in uncontrolled economic
development policies of local governments.
In the third chapter, this dissertation narrows the range of the research subject to
analyze the diffusion mechanism of economic development policies. Generally,
competition among local governments may lead to introducing competitive new polices.
However, we do not know exactly how the extent of competition among municipalities
impacts the utilization of business incentives. This chapter helps find the significant link
between competition and economic development policies. Thus, this chapter enables us
to logically understand one of the diffusion mechanisms of development policies.
Second, this chapter compares mayor–council and council–manager systems in terms of
their adoption and extent of use of business incentives. Council–manager system tend to
considerably constrain the adoption and extent use of incentives. This result could
provide policy makers with meaningful implications because only a few studies analyze
how economic development polices can be effectively constrained. This chapter gives a
reasonable answer and serves as basis for future studies. Additionally, the result could
give adequate justification for local government reform from mayor–council to council–
manager systems.
The fourth chapter focuses on the state government to analyze the determinant of
business incentives. One of the strengths of this chapter is that this analysis is based on
comprehensive data. Most previous studies mainly focus on specific areas, not the
national level. Consequently, it is difficult to generalize the result and find meaningful
implications for related fields. In contrast, the study data cover most parts of US
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utilization of business incentives. Based on this unique data set, this chapter reveals the
importance of politics for economic development policies. The relationship between
politics and development policies is vague, and the causality between politics and
incentives is unknown. This chapter helps reveal such relationship, specifically how
political ideology differently affects each business incentive. This result could also give a
blanket answer for constraining unnecessary incentives. The exclusion of politics from
development policies could alleviate the reckless use of business incentives. In this sense,
this would be a valuable implication for policy makers.
Lastly, the fifth chapter holds further significance because it provides valuable
evidence of the effectiveness of policy in this field by using comprehensive data.
Although we theoretically anticipate the characteristics of development policies, there is
no clear empirical evidence supporting the zero-sum mechanism of such policies. Based
on the employment and unemployment rates of most states, we confirm that the effect of
business incentives is negligible. This result may persuade policy makers to reconsider
overall economic development policies and could become a strong empirical
counterargument to supporters of economic development policies.
Although this dissertation is aimed at contributing to the current literature by
overcoming previous limitations, a few limitations may be suggested. First, the problem
of endogeneity could arise. Specifically, causality from government structure to
economic development policy decisions can be influenced by causality by the other way.
This possibility would require a change of the form of government, which sometimes
occurs, mostly moving toward the council-manager form, which is the direction the
dissertation recommends. However, the changes of the form of government are slow and
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infrequent because the requirements to change are strict, unlike elections. Additionally,
using only cities that actually changed would reduce the data set too much. In this sense,
this study assumes that the government structure has long been fixed. It is less likely to
be endogenous if the form has long been fixed.
Second, there is a possibility that this study has omitted variable bias although it
tries to include all relevant variables. For example, omitted variables concerning a local
government’s financial condition could bias the estimated effect of the form of
government if the financial conditions are related to the form of government. There is
another possibility that municipalities managed better, in general, tend to choose to have
a council-manager system. This possibility would, however, be consistent with the point
of the dissertation that the council-manager system is likely to have better financial
prospects than the mayor-council system.
This study is concerned mainly with state policy, which is important because only
a few studies have focused on the state level in economic development policies. Although
chapter three deals with the local government level in economic development policies, it
does not analyze the overall effect of economic development policy at the local
government level. It is an undeniable fact that local policy can be very influential in
economic development policies, such as TIF matters. In other words, theoretically, it is
desirable to consider state policy and local policy at the same time. However, considering
the conditions given, the data requirements to obtain an equivalent amount of information
are much higher. This fact suggests a future study direction that would be a valuable
addition to the study of the topic.
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